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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the interrelationships between child labor, schooling and 
health, using nationally representative data from the United States and from Brazil. In 
developing countries, child labor can begin at an early age. However, child labor can be 
found in developed countries as well, particularly in the teenage years. This dissertation 
examines (1) whether and how much current state child labor legislation affects the 
employment and schooling decisions of U.S. high school students; (2) whether there is a 
cumulative effect of teen work on schooling outcomes; and (3) whether adults who worked 
as children experience increased incidence of illness or physical disability in Brazil. 
Variation in state government restrictions on child labor, the availability and quality of local 
schools, and the opportunity cost of schooling are used as instruments to correct for the 
potential endogeneity of child labor or years of schooling. This dissertation shows that U.S. 
child labor laws are not effectively enforced in limiting teen labor supply or in improving 
schooling outcomes. Nevertheless, child labor does have adverse consequences on lifetime 
learning and health, even if the work is legal and not of the “worst forms” of child labor, 
although these consequences are often of modest magnitudes. These findings suggest that 
policies limiting child labor may be justified as a means of improving the child’s welfare 
later in life, but weak enforcement means that such policies have been only modestly 
successful in the past.
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Chapter 1. General Introduction 
 
 This dissertation is composed of three essays aimed at improving our understanding 
of the causes and consequences of child labor. The International Labor Organization (ILO) 
estimated that in 2000, there were 352 million children aged 5 to 17 who were economically 
active. This accounts for about one-fifth of all children in that age group. Of these, 171 
million children were estimated to work in hazardous conditions either because the 
production process is considered hazardous or because the children work more than 43 hours 
per week.  
 In developing countries, child labor can begin at an early age.  For example, about 
one-third of Brazilian adults first entered labor market before 12, the youngest legal working 
age. However, child labor can be found in developed countries as well, particularly in the 
teenage years. According to the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97), the 
proportion of U.S. high school students working during the school year ranges from 23% in 
the freshman year to 75% in the senior year.  
Child labor has drawn considerable attention from policy makers over the last decade. 
The policy prescriptions are not necessarily consistent. While some policy makers advocated 
programs to combine school and work aiming at improving the transition to full-time 
employment, others have advocated restrictions on youth employment. The high proportion 
of high school children who hold jobs clearly suggests that many parents view working while 
in school positively, at least for some youth. 
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ILO Convention 182 passed in 1999 is aimed at eliminating the worst forms of child 
labor. The worst forms have been defined as work that by its nature harms the child’s 
physical and emotional development such as bonded labor, prostitution, or drug trafficking. 
However, it is possible that less obviously damaging forms of child labor could have lifetime 
adverse consequences for lifetime well-being if working while young adversely affects 
lifetime educational attainment or health. 
Because of the lack of consensus on the desirability of working while attending 
school or of entering the labor market at an early age, numerous recent studies have 
investigated the causes and consequences of child labor in both developed and developing 
countries. Human capital theory emphasizes the importance of forgone earnings as a cost of 
schooling, and so a common focus has been to investigate tradeoffs between current earnings 
and consumption against human capital accumulation and enhanced future earnings and 
consumption. Particular emphasis has been paid to identifying the magnitude of presumed 
lost human capital when children spend more time at market work. Less attention has been 
paid to other potential costs of early labor market entry on the physical and mental health of 
the child. Even less has been learned about potential permanent health consequences from 
working as a child. 
This dissertation examines (1) whether and how much current state child labor 
legislation affects the employment and schooling decisions of U.S. high school students; (2) 
whether intensity of working during the school year affects the schooling outcomes of high 
school students in the U.S.; and (3) whether adults who worked as children experience 
increased incidence of illness or physical disability in Brazil. 
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There are two main themes that span the essays in this dissertation. One of them is to 
correct for the likely endogeneity of child labor or years of schooling. Unobserved individual 
abilities or health endowments may affect the amount of time a child spends in school or at 
work, and these unobserved endowments will also affect schooling and health outcomes. 
Ordinary Least Squares estimates that do not account for these unobserved attributes will 
yield biased estimates of the impact of child labor on schooling and health outcomes. To 
address the estimation problem, the instrumental variable strategy is used. Variation in state 
government restrictions on child labor, the availability and quality of local schools, and the 
opportunity cost of schooling are used as instruments for endogenous hours worked, age of 
labor market entry and years of schooling completed. 
A second common theme considers the cumulative or long term effects of child labor. 
It is possible that child labor has permanent effects on success in school that are only 
apparent after many years. Similarly, the adverse health consequences of child labor may 
take time to manifest themselves. To account for this potential problem, I examine whether 
the cumulative work histories of U.S high school students affect schooling outcomes. I also 
examine whether working as a child results in the early onset of adverse health outcomes for 
samples of adults in Brazil. 
 The dissertation is organized as follows. In the second chapter of the dissertation, I 
examine how state child labor laws affect the time American high-school aged youth devote 
to school and work. In the United States, both federal and state governments have tried to 
establish and enforce child labor laws to protect youth from work that interferes with their 
schooling. While federal child labor law focuses on the work experience of minors, 
especially those aged 15 and below, state child labor laws often place further restrictions on 
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the work activities of 16- and 17-year olds. The two most common state child labor 
restrictions are work permit requirements for teenagers and school dropout ages that are more 
stringent than federal requirements. If these laws are effectively targeted and enforced, 
children living in states legislating more stringent child labor laws should be less likely to 
work, should work fewer hours if they do work, and they should have better average 
schooling outcomes. 
The third chapter examines the effect of school-year work on schooling outcomes 
using the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Working while in school and school 
performance are joint decisions, and so estimates of the impact of work on schooling 
outcomes must correct for the likely endogeneity of working while in school. Variation in 
individual date of birth and in state truancy laws along with the strength of local demand for 
low-skill labor are used as instruments for endogenous cumulative work hours during the 
high school career. Several measures of schooling outcomes are used: probability of dropout: 
high school grade point average: and the probability of attending college.  Working may 
affect some but not all outcomes.  
In chapter four, I investigate whether adults who entered the labor market early in life 
suffer higher rates of chronic diseases and functional limitations in adulthood. Estimating the 
causal effect of early entry into labor market on adult health is complicated by the selection 
process which sorts children into the labor market. Another confounding factor is that child 
labor may affect a child’s years of schooling completed, and education has been shown to 
positively affect adult health. The effect of child labor on education in Brazil is uncertain, 
and in turn, a complete assessment of the effect of child labor on health must consider the 
indirect effect of child labor on schooling. The analysis corrects for the likely endogeneity of 
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child labor and years of schooling using variation in number of schools per children, number 
of teachers per children and low skill wages at the time the adults were children. 
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      Chapter 2. If Johnny Can’t Work, Can Johnny Read Better?: 
 
                         Child Labor Laws, Labor Supply and Schooling Outcomes 
 
Abstract 
In the United States, both federal and state governments have tried to establish and 
enforce child labor laws to protect youth from work that interferes with their schooling. 
While federal child labor law focuses on the work experience of minors, especially those 
aged 15 and below; state child labor laws often restrict the work activities of 16- and 17-year 
olds. The two most common state child labor restrictions are work permit requirements for 
teenagers and school dropout ages that are more stringent than federal requirements. If these 
laws are effectively targeted and enforced, children living in states legislating more stringent 
child labor laws should be less likely to work, should work fewer hours if they do work, and 
they should have better average schooling outcomes. The results show that stricter state laws 
do not lower the likelihood that a child works or the likelihood a working child works in 
excess of federal guidelines, although they do lower how frequently a child engages in illegal 
work. State work permit requirements have a very small positive effect on the likelihood of 
college entry. Truancy laws do not affect the likelihood of going to college, but increase 
marginally high school academic performance. 
2.1. Introduction  
 A surprisingly large proportion of American high school-aged youth works while in 
school. Nearly one-fifth of 14 year-olds, the youngest legal working age, works at least one 
week at any point during school in session. The likelihood of working rises steadily with age: 
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29% of 15-year-olds; 60% of 16-year-olds; 71% of 17-year-olds.1 These high youth 
employment rates raise concerns about the desirability of working while attending high 
school.  
Parents believe that child labor can foster self-reliance and money management skills, 
smooth the transition from school to work, and allow the child to save money for college. 
However, employment during high school could lead to less time being spent on academic or 
extracurricular activities that presumably improve learning while in school. Under current 
competing views, some policy makers advocated programs to improve school - work 
connections for youth2 while others have advocated restriction on child labor.3 
In the United States, both federal and state governments have tried to establish and 
enforce child labor laws to protect youth from work that may be dangerous and that may 
interfere with their schooling. Since 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) has 
regulated child labor at the Federal level. It limits the number of hours and the type of work 
for 14- and 15-year olds. In addition, many state laws mandate standards that go beyond the 
Federal law. The most common of these set maximum hours and/or night work restrictions 
for 16- and 17-year olds or set more stringent restrictions on school-leaving age.  
This study examines how state child labor legislation affects the employment and 
school decisions of youth aged 14 through 17. Our findings suggest that stricter state child 
labor laws do not lower the likelihood that a child works, they do not lower the likelihood of 
                                                 
1  Similar patterns are shown in Rothstein (2001) and in USDL 03-40, a news release from the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (2003). There are two types of job related to early work experience. “Employee” jobs involve 
an ongoing relationship with a particular employer (for example, working in a grocery market). “Freelance” 
jobs have no specific boss (for example, babysitting). We only use information on employee jobs and those are 
the only jobs that can be effectively regulated by the government.. 
2 For example, “1994 School-to-Work Opportunities Act” includes incentives for states to strengthen the 
linkage between school and work. 
3 For example, in 1998, National Research Council panel recommended that the number of hours of work for 
16- and 17-years olds while in school be limited. 
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working in excess of federal hours limits, and they only modestly lower how frequently a 
child violates the federally proscribed hours maximum. Furthermore, children who work 
excessive hours relative to the legal limits do not suffer inferior schooling outcomes. 
Nevertheless, stricter state work permit requirements do have a small, positive effect on 
college entry but not high school performance. Higher state school truancy ages have a small 
positive effect on high school grade points but not on high school completion rates and 
college entry. Overall, results suggest that stricter laws regulating child labor and truancy age 
are only marginally successful in altering the schooling and labor choices of U.S. teens. 
The next section summarizes the existing literature on the relationships among child 
labor laws, youth employment and their schooling outcomes. Section 2.3 describes existing 
federal and state child labor laws. Section 2.4 specifies an empirical strategy for measuring 
how state laws affect labor supply and schooling choices. Section 2.5 presents the data and 
section 2.6 reviews our results. In section 2.7, we discuss the implications of this study for 
policy and further research. 
2.2. Literature Review 
Lleras-Muney (2002) examined how state compulsory attendance and child labor 
laws contributed to the increase in educational attainment of U.S. residents in the first half of 
the twentieth century. Laws requiring children to attend 1 more year of school or increasing 
the minimum working age by one year increased average years of schooling by 5 percent 
from 1915 to 1939. These laws not only increased average education levels but also 
decreased education inequality.  
Nevertheless, recent studies have argued that illegal child labor is common. 
Moskowitz (2000) argues that federal and state child labor laws do not adequately protect 
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children against occupational hazards. Because laws that deal with child labor are only 
weakly enforced due to poor funding and weak incentives to inspect worksites, significant 
numbers of teens in the United States are employed illegally. Kruse and Mahony (2000) 
provide comprehensive estimates of the extent of illegal child labor in the United States using 
Current Population Survey (CPS) and other sources.4 They estimate that 154,000 children 
under 18 or roughly 0.7% of the population of children were engaged in working in violation 
of state or federal child laws in an average week.5 Because teenagers move in and out of the 
labor force frequently, the fraction of teens working illegally during a year is much larger. 
The Moskowitz and Kruse and Mahoney studies leave unanswered whether there are 
adverse consequences for children engaged in illegal child labor. This study extends their 
work by examining how state child labor laws affect child work time allocation and school 
outcomes. Because states vary in the strictness of state labor and truancy regulations, we can 
determine if stricter laws are effective in limiting teen work and whether they improve 
schooling outcomes. 
2.3. Child Labor Laws 
 States can have stricter child labor laws than the federal law, but the federal child 
labor laws hold in the absence of stricter state laws. Federal child labor provisions covered by 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) are summarized in Appendix 1. In the United States, 
FLSA gives the Department of Labor authority to prohibit minors under age 18 from working 
in occupations deemed too hazardous. The FLSA also limits the number of hours and times 
                                                 
4 They combined 33 monthly CPS surveys from January 1995 to September 1997 in order to estimate illegal 
employment of teens aged 15 and older. Their information on 14-years old and younger workers was taken from 
the NLSY79, the NLSY97 and the NLS-Adolescent Health data. 
5 They determined illegal working by matching occupation codes of youth into the federal or state restrictions 
on type of work. Also, hours restriction of FLSA is applied to estimate of illegal working of 14-and 15-year-
olds. 
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of day that 14- and 15-year olds can work. At those ages, children are limited to work a 
maximum of three hours per day and eight hours per week during weeks that school is in 
session, and no more than forty hours per week during school vacations. Children under the 
age of 14 are prohibited from working except for agricultural employment, working for a 
family business, or performing “freelance work” such as babysitting or delivering 
newspapers. Child labor in agriculture is much less regulated. Regardless of age, children 
may be employed in any non-hazardous farm job without any restriction on number of hours 
during the school year. Children younger than age 14 may work only on their parents’ farm 
or on another farm with the written consent of their parents. Children who are 14 or older 
may work on farms without parental consent. By age 16, youths are no longer subject to 
protective restrictions on agricultural jobs which are regarded as hazardous. 
While the FLSA concentrates on the labor of youth under 16 years of age, some states 
have extended restrictions to older youth. Sixteen states have child labor laws restricting the 
working hours of 16 and 17 year-old youth through a work permit requirement (See 
Appendix 2). An additional 22 states require work permits for 14 and 15 year olds that are 
more restrictive than the federal requirements. State compulsory school attendance laws limit 
work indirectly by requiring time in school. Twenty two states have truancy ages above 16, 
the federal truancy age (See Appendix 3).  
 The stated goal of the FLSA and state child labor law is to protect youth from long 
work hours or dangerous working conditions. Presumably, the hours restrictions are intended 
to guide youth on levels of work intensity that will not retard educational development but 
will allow work experience that may ease entry into the full-time labor market after leaving 
high school. If these laws are effective, they should have a positive impact on the probability 
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of completing high school or attending college and should improve academic performance in 
high school. The next section proposes an empirical strategy for assessing whether those 
expectations are consistent with the data on child academic progress across states. 
2.4. Model Specification 
 Parents decide (or at least approve) their child’s intensity of employment. Let ijW  be 
an ordered response representing progressively higher values {0, 1, 2, 3} depending on hours 
of work for a child i in state j. To relate the observed data to our policy application, we set 
the thresholds relative to the legal federal limits on child working hours. For a child who 
does not work at all during school year, 0=ijW . For a child who works within FLSA 
guidelines, 1=ijW . 2=ijW indicates one to five weekly violations of FLSA hours limits during 
the year. 3=ijW  is for children whose weekly work hours violated federal guidelines more 
than five weeks in the school year.  
 There are two issues that require comment regarding our use of these ordered work 
states. First, we use federal hours limits as the reference for ijW  despite the fact that we are 
evaluating state child labor laws. Had we used the state limits as the reference, states with 
more restrictive laws would have violations that would not be counted as violation in more 
lax states. The federal guidelines provide a common reference across all states. Second, we 
could have used child work hours directly rather than these four groupings. Our use of the 
groups helps to highlight the threshold nature of working within versus working outside the 
FLSA guidelines. In addition, the groupings may help to sidestep some measurement 
problems associated with recollections of working hours during the year. We expect that 
youth may be able to recall occasional from frequent weekly hours violations, but not 
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necessarily the actual number of occurrences of those violations. Therefore the ordered 
groupings may be better measures of the incidence of illegal work.  
 We use an ordered probit specification to model teen labor supply. Letting *ijW
 be a 
latent variable indexing progressively greater work intensity, we assume  
 ij
W
ij
W
ijij DZW εγβ ++=
* ,           (1) 
where ijD  is a dummy variable indicating whether the state has more restrictive child labor 
laws than the federal level; ijZ  is a vector of individual and household demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics; and ijε  is a random error for child i in state j. As 
*
ijW  increases, 
the probability a child is found in a particular  work intensity state is given by   
 0=ijW    if 0
*
≤ijW    
1=ijW     if 1
*0 µ≤< ijW                             (2)   
2=ijW   if 2
*
1 µµ ≤< ijW  
 3=ijW    if
*
2 ijW<µ .  
If we assume the errors are distributed standard normal conditional on ijZ and ijD , the 
regression parameters ,W Wβ γ and the two cut points can be estimated as an ordered probit 
specification using maximum likelihood. 
 In typical cases, if restrictive state child labor laws are effective in regulating work 
intensity, then 0.Wγ <   In our ordered specification, it is possible that the laws may both shift 
children into legal work from illegal work, but also from not working to working, in which 
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case the opposite sign might be obtained. To check for this possibility, we must also evaluate 
the probability of each outcome ijW  as the laws change.
6 
 To examine the effect of child labor laws on schooling outcomes, we consider the 
regression 
ijS  = 0δ  + 
E
DijZ β + 
D
ij SD γ  + ijν ,                                                     (3)  
where ijS  is the schooling outcomes mentioned above; ijν  is the error term; and the other 
variables are as defined above. If restrictions on child labor are useful, they should positively 
affect measurable academic outcomes so that DSγ >0.  
 If the restrictions on child labor are set appropriately, we should find stronger effects 
of illegal than legal labor and there should be no adverse impact of legal labor on school 
outcomes. To investigate these hypotheses, we can insert measures of hours worked within 
and beyond the federal guidelines as measures of the degree of violation of child labor limits. 
These hypotheses can be tested directly by replacing ijD by ijW  in (3) so that 
ijS  = 0δ  + 
E
WijZ β  + 
W
ij SW γ  + ijυ .                                                   (4)  
Youth working beyond federal guidelines should suffer adverse schooling outcomes so that 
0WSγ <  .  
      A. Are state child labor laws exogenous? 
                                                 
6 Using the standard normal distribution for ijε  and using βX  as shorthand notation for (
W
ij
W
ij DZ γβ + ),  
Pr( 0=ijW )  = Pr )0(
*
≤ijW = )0( ≤+ ijX εβ  =Φ ( βX ), Pr( 1=ijW )= Pr(0<
*
ijW  ≤ 1µ ) = (0< ≤+ )( ijX εβ 1µ ) 
= )( 1 βµ X−Φ - )( βX−Φ ,… ,and Pr( )2
* µ≥ijW = ( )2µεβ ≥+ ijX = 1- )( 2 βµ X−Φ  where Φ  is the standard 
normal cumulative distribution function. Each of these probabilities can be evaluated at ijD =1 and ijD =0, 
holding all other exogenous variables constant. 
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The specifications above presume that state child labor and truancy laws are 
exogenous. This would not be true if households move across state boundaries because of the 
child labor or truancy laws, or if those laws are altered in response to prevailing and 
pervasive tastes for child labor or schooling outcomes in the state. It seems unlikely that 
parents migrate across states because of state laws restricting child labor, but it is more 
plausible that child labor laws are set in response to preexisting attitudes toward child labor 
in the state. We explore the issue using a probit regression of a dichotomous variable 
indicating the existence of restrictive state child labor laws on state per capita income, state 
unionization rates and a dummy variable indicating whether the state has a higher minimum 
wage than the federal minimum wage rate. States are defined as having more stringent child 
labor laws if they require a work permit for 16- or 17-year olds or if they specified a legal 
dropout age above age 16. Note that this specification does not presume a causal relationship 
between the regressors and the dependent variable—it is merely a convenient mechanism to 
assess underlying correlations in the data. For example, a high correlation between minimum 
wage and child labor legislation would suggest a greater likelihood that an underlying taste 
for protective labor legislation exists in the state. 
Results are reported in Table 1. The first column (work permit requirement) and the 
second column (compulsory schooling attendance) show that states with restrictive child 
labor legislation are not disproportionately wealthy, unionized, or prone to passing other 
protective legislation.7 While this is not a definitive test, it does not appear that state child 
                                                 
7 The results are similar when ordered measures reflecting increasing rigor of child labor laws are used in place 
of the dummy variables. For example, when ordered measures of the existence of a work permit requirement 
with higher values for requirements through ages 16, 17 and 18 are used in place of the dichotomous measure, 
we also find no significant predictors of the existence of restrictive child labor legislation. 
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labor laws are highly correlated with other state restrictive legislation or preexisting tastes 
that would bias our coefficient estimates. 
2.5. Data 
      A. NLSY97 
 The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) provides data on the 
transition from school to work for a representative sample of U.S. youths born in 1980 
through 1984. The NLSY97 sample covers 43 states and provides a wealth of useful 
information on household factors that may be correlated with labor market behavior and 
educational experiences. It also tracks the working hours of youths on a weekly basis from 
age 14 onward. The tracking data also include information on whether and when respondents 
obtained a high school diploma, how well they performed in school, and whether they went 
to college. 
 By May 31, 2002, roughly two-thirds of the NLSY97 sample was old enough to have 
graduated from high school, and roughly 77% of those had actually graduated. We are 
interested in assessing how measures of child labor intensity and school performance are 
related to state child labor and truancy laws, holding constant ijZ  that should affect schooling 
and employment decisions. 
 The vector ijZ  includes measures of child ability, gender and race, and the 
socioeconomic and demographic attributes of the parents. Child ability is measured by 8th 
grade GPA. Poor academic preparation for high school may lower the returns to schooling 
and increase the likelihood of working at a young age. Previous studies have shown that a 
child’s performance in school is strongly influenced by the child’s parents. We control for 
the presence of two biological parents in the household and households with at least one 
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missing parent. We also control for the education of the father and mother and for aggregate 
household income, all of which would be expected to raise household demand for schooling. 
The impact of these variables on child labor is less certain in the literature. Finally, we 
include a dummy variable for rural residence, as there may be more demand for child labor in 
rural areas, particularly with regard to agricultural work.  
      B. Descriptive analysis 
 
         B.1. Employment experience of high school-aged youth 
 
Table 2 reports the school year employment rate and average working hours of 
eventual high school graduates. Samples are further broken down by demographic and 
community characteristics. American youths are more likely to work as they get older. 
Nineteen percent of children work in their 14th year at an average of 6.4 hours per week. 
Labor force participation dramatically increases to 61% by age 16, with average weekly 
hours worked rising to 11.6. There is a significant difference between boys’ and girls’ labor-
force participation rates and cumulative working hours. At earlier age, boys are more likely 
to work, but the gap disappears by age 17. At all ages, however, boys work more hours. 
White children have higher labor force participation rates and work more hours than either 
Black or Hispanic youth. Those with the highest 8th grade GPAs are the most likely to work, 
but they work fewer hours per week.  
Child labor force participation differs significantly by parental attributes. Children 
with two-biological parents in the household are more likely to work. Children worked least 
if their parents did not complete high school. They worked most if their parents had some 
college training. However, children with more educated parents tend to work more modest 
hours. Students in households with lower income might be expected to work more in order to 
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pay for additional schooling or to finance current consumption. However, youth in the lowest 
income households are the least likely to work. Youth in wealthier households participate 
most in the labor market, but they work fewer hours than average. Rural youth are modestly 
more likely to work than their urban counterparts. The rural-urban gap in average cumulative 
hours shrinks with age. 
         B.2 Illegal youth employment 
To assess the effectiveness of child labor regulations, we need to know how many 
youth are working illegally. We define a work week as illegal if a child worked an excessive 
number of hours using the FLSA standards as a gauge. The most common violation is 
working beyond the legal hours. By federal standards, 14-and 15-year-olds are regarded as 
working illegally if they worked over 40 hours per week during the summer or more than 18 
hours per week when school is in session. Following the classification used in the model, 
Table 3 shows the distribution of employment states for youth aged 14 and 15 between 1994 
and 1997. Work states 3,2=ijW  indicate working in violation of FLSA maximum hours limits. 
For high school graduates, 3% of 14-year-olds worked illegally between 1 and 5 weeks 
during the school year or 17% of working 14-year olds. A similar proportion violated the law 
more than 5 weeks of the school year. By age 15, the proportion of regularly violating the 
hours’ restrictions during the school year rises to 9% or nearly one-third of working 15-year-
olds. Dropouts violated FLSA guidelines at the almost same rate. However, conditional on 
working, dropouts were more likely to work in violation of FLSA hours limits. Violations 
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were less common in summer months than during the school year, reflecting the much higher 
hours limits during school vacations.8  
Table 4 presents information on the incidence of illegal work for 14-15 year old 
children by whether they ultimately dropped out of or graduated from high school. The 
information is further broken down by demographic characteristics. Children who eventually 
dropped out of school were significantly less likely to work than those who eventually 
graduated from high school. However, graduates worked more commonly within federal 
hours guidelines. White and Hispanic dropouts are more likely to violate FLSA hours limits, 
but for the most part, the demographic distribution of illegal workers is similar between 
dropouts and graduates.  
2.6. Empirical Results 
      A. Are state child labor laws effective in limiting child labor? 
Taking the state child labor laws as exogenous, we examine whether variation in the 
rigor of the laws affects employment intensity or intensity of violations federal labor laws at 
age 14 and 15 shown in equation (1). Table 5 contains the estimates from the ordered probit 
equation for youth employment at ages 14 and 15 among high school graduates.  
 The first three columns of Table 5 show that the estimated coefficients on the dummy 
variables related to rigor of state child labor laws are insignificant for youth employment 
status at age 14. Neither work permit requirements nor truancy laws alter the intensity of 
work for 14-year-olds. The same conclusions hold for 15-year-olds. It does not appear that 
                                                 
8  The percent of youth who violated FLSA standards in this study is greater than reported by Kruse and 
Mahony (2000) based on the Current Population Survey (CPS). This is to be expected because the NLSY97 
reports employment over 52 weeks rather than only in the last week as in the CPS. Also, the CPS relies on a 
primary respondent other than the youth him or herself to collect data on youth employment. The NLSY97 
survey is always answered by youths themselves. Parents may not always be aware of the children’s working 
hours, especially if the employment is sporadic or occasionally involves excessive hours.  
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state child labor regulations affect whether a child works, how much a child works, or 
whether the child works in violation of federal guidelines. Of the other factors, youth are 
more likely to work in violation of federal guidelines if they are white, male, rural, and from 
wealthier households. 
 To obtain a clearer idea of the impact of state child labor laws on probability of each 
work intensity state, we evaluate the probabilities of each outcome at sample means.9   We 
estimate the probabilities alternating WD  (or SD ) = 1 and WD  (or SD ) = 0, all other variables 
held at their averages.10  When WD  =0, the predicted probabilities are Pr ( 0=ijW ) = 0.82, Pr 
( 1=ijW ) = 0.12, Pr ( 2=ijW ) = 0.03 and Pr ( 3=ijW ) = 0.03. The comparable probabilities 
when WD  =1 are 0.82, 0.12, 0.03 and 0.03 with small change in third decimal place. On the 
basis of this procedure, Table 6 summarizes the marginal effect of placing more stringent 
state child labor laws on work intensity. More stringent work permit requirements reduce the 
incidence of legal and illegal work by less than one percentage point. The same lack of 
substantial change in labor supply choices can be seen contrasting the presence and the 
absence of stringent state compulsory attendance laws. Controlling for other demographic 
factors, the predicted probability of working in violation of the FLSA is decreased by less 
than 1% by imposing more stringent compulsory attendance laws.  
It is possible that the combination of constraints on child labor may matter, even 
when no individual policy appears to affect choices (Moehling, 1999). We report the change 
in probability of each employment state when both policies are operative compared to neither 
policy being in effect. The combined policies lower the likelihood of working by only 2 
                                                 
9 Our derivations are based on Greene (1997). 
10 See Appendix 4 for detailed outcomes.  
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percentage points and decrease the likelihood of frequent federal hours violations by less 
than one percentage point. Nearly identical results are found for 15 year olds. On the whole, 
state work permit requirements and compulsory school attendance laws change child labor 
patterns only marginally. It is difficult to believe that these modest effects alter the time 
available for schooling by an economically important amount.  
      B. Are state child labor laws effective in raising schooling attainment? 
   Child labor laws aim to protect youth from work that hinders their education. Table 7 
report estimates of equation (3). Our measures of schooling outcomes include high school 
grade point average and completion and the choice to attend college. Requiring a work 
permit under age 18 does not seem to affect the probability of completing high school, nor 
does it affect high school GPA. It does raise the probability of attending college by 3 
percentage points at the 10% significant level. Compulsory attendance laws that require 
youth to stay in school through ages 17 or 18 have small positive effects on high school GPA. 
More stringent compulsory attendance laws raise high school GPA by 0.06 or 2%. State 
compulsory attendance laws have no discernable effect on the probability of attending 
college. The combined effect of those two state laws on schooling attainment is found only 
on high school GPA in a significant level.  
 The rest of the effects are sensible. Students are more likely to complete high school 
and attend college if they have a high 8th grade GPA, high household income, well-educated 
parents, and with both parents present in the home.  
      C. Are federal hours guidelines effective in raising schooling attainment? 
It appears that state laws are marginally effective in raising schooling outcomes even 
if they do not affect child labor supply decisions. This begs the question of whether hours 
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guidelines are set effectively so as to ensure children’s schooling does not suffer. To examine 
this question, we estimate equation (4). Dummy variables indicate three employment status 
measures, ( ijW = 1, 2, 3) with non-workers ( ijW = 0) as the reference group. The results are 
given in Table 8.  
The reference state is not working ( 0=ijW ). Compared to children not working, we 
find that children working within FLSA limits have a greater likelihood of completing high 
school. However, those frequently working in violation of FLSA are no less likely to 
complete high school than are children who do not work at all. There is no discernible effect 
of child labor patterns on high school GPA or the probability of going to college. Overall, 
there is no strong consistent evidence that children working hours in excess of the federal 
hours guidelines have inferior schooling outcomes relative to children who do not work at all. 
This suggests that the federal guidelines are not well targeted to limit types of child labor that 
hinder academic outcomes.  
 Several papers have used variation in child labor regulations across states to identify 
potentially endogenous hours of work in equations explaining schooling outcomes. The weak 
power of state labor regulations to explain variation in the probability of violating FLSA 
hours guidelines require that we interpret school outcome equations that use state labor laws 
as instruments with considerable caution. Nevertheless, we report the results in Table 9 
which use the predicted probability that the child repeatedly violates FLSA hours guidelines, 
Pr( ijW = 3), as the measure of child work while in school. The measures of schooling 
outcomes are not significantly affected by higher predicted probability of FLSA hours 
violations, consistent with our findings from Table 8.  
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2.7. Conclusion 
If restrictions on child labor are useful, they should be tied to measurable employment 
status or academic outcomes. Our study show that more stringent state child labor laws 
requiring work permit under age 18 and mandating that children stay in school through age 
17 or 18 years have almost no impact on labor market entry decisions or the frequency of 
working hours in violation of federal labor law. In addition, youth whose work hours exceed 
federal guidelines do not have inferior schooling outcomes to teens who do not work at all. 
These findings suggest that state labor laws do not have strong effects on youth labor supply 
choices and that hours restrictions are not well supported by evidence on adverse impacts of 
work hours on schooling. 
State truancy and work permit regulations do have small positive effects on high 
school academic performance, the likelihood of completing high school, and the likelihood of 
entering college. However, in all cases the effects are smaller than 3%. Past studies have 
shown that these laws have had more substantial effects on schooling decisions historically.  
Variations in state employment and truancy laws have played a prominent role in studies of 
returns to schooling. Historically, changes in federal and state labor laws have been found to 
have important effects on youth schooling and labor supply decisions. Consequently, these 
laws have proven useful as exogenous factors shifting years of schooling to correct for 
endogeneity in years of schooling completed. Our findings suggest that these laws are much 
weaker instruments for current educational and labor supply decisions than they may have 
been historically.  
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 Table 1. Effect of state characteristics on the rigor of state child labor laws using probit analysis (N=51) 
 
 State child labor laws 
State characteristics Work permit requirement 
under age 18 )1( =wD  
Compulsory schooling attendance 
above age 16 )1( =sD  
Log of state per capita income 2.315 
(1.726) 
-2.229 
(1.572) 
State union density .029 
(.037) 
.002 
(.036) 
State minimum wage above FLSA standard -.108 
(.535) 
.622 
(.510) 
Constant -24.369 
(17.231) 
22.163 
(15.652) 
   
Log-likelihood -28.317 -33.105 
Pseudo R2 .083 .042 
 Note. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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 Table 2. Percent of high school graduates employed while ages 14 to 17 in 1994-2001 and average weekly hours worked of  
 working participants during the school year by individual characteristics (N=3384) 
 
Characteristics Age14 Age15 Age16 Age17 Age14-17 
Total 18.9 
(6.4) 
29.3 
(8.2) 
60.5 
(11.6) 
73.3 
(16.0) 
81.7 
(6.8) 
Gender      
  Female 14.3 
(5.7) 
26.3 
(7.4) 
59.3 
(11.3) 
73.5 
(15.8) 
80.6 
(5.9) 
  Male 24.1 
(7.0) 
32.6 
(8.9) 
61.8 
(11.9) 
73.0 
(16.3) 
82.9 
(7.2) 
Race or Ethnicity      
  Black 11.1 
(5.5) 
19.6 
(7.6) 
50.6 
(12.2) 
64.7 
(15.3) 
73.8 
(6.2) 
  Hispanic 14.7 
(5.0) 
20.2 
(7.3) 
48.7 
(11.2) 
64.8 
(15.4) 
73.1 
(6.0) 
  White 23.4 
(6.9) 
36.0 
(8.4) 
68.2 
(11.6) 
79.4 
(16.4) 
87.5 
(7.3) 
8
th
 Grade GPA      
  Less than 2.50 18.3 
(5.9) 
27.8 
(7.6) 
59.5 
(11.8) 
72.3 
(16.1) 
81.4 
(6.7) 
  2.51 – 3.50 18.2 
(6.5) 
29.0 
(8.2) 
60.2 
(11.9) 
73.9 
(16.6) 
81.6 
(7.0) 
  3.51 – 4.00 20.9 
(6.9) 
31.4 
(8.7) 
62.2 
(10.7) 
73.3 
(15.0) 
82.1 
(6.7) 
Family Structure      
  Two-biological  parents 21.5 
(6.3) 
30.9 
(8.2) 
61.7 
(11.3) 
73.7 
(15.6) 
82.5 
(6.8) 
  Not Two-biological  parents 14.9 
(6.7) 
26.8 
(8.2) 
58.6 
(12.1) 
72.7 
(16.7) 
80.5 
(6.9) 
 Note. Average hours worked per week is computed by dividing cumulative hours of work during school year at the age into the number of weeks 
           in the school term. Weekly hours worked is in parenthesis.
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 Table 2. (Continued) 
 
Characteristics Age14 Age15 Age16 Age17 Age14-17 
Father’s education      
  HS dropout 16.5 
(5.7) 
22.0 
(8.3) 
52.5 
(13.3) 
69.5 
(16.2) 
75.8 
(6.9) 
  HS graduate 21.5 
(7.4) 
31.5 
(8.6) 
63.9 
(12.2) 
76.6 
(17.3) 
84.1 
(7.5) 
  Some College 22.1 
(6.9) 
34.0 
(8.8) 
67.3 
(11.9) 
78.3 
(16.9) 
86.8 
(7.4) 
  College and higher 20.8 
(5.5) 
32.0 
(7.0) 
63.0 
(9.7) 
73.5 
(13.9) 
82.9 
(5.9) 
Mother’s education      
  HS dropout 13.1 
(6.8) 
20.4 
(8.6) 
48.3 
(12.0) 
63.0 
(16.0) 
71.7 
(6.5) 
  HS graduate 20.6 
(6.8) 
31.3 
(8.8) 
63.0 
(12.4) 
76.7 
(17.4) 
83.7 
(7.6) 
  Some College 18.9 
(5.9) 
32.0 
(8.4) 
64.5 
(11.5) 
79.7 
(15.7) 
86.2 
(6.9) 
  College and higher 20.8 
(5.8) 
29.5 
(6.8) 
60.7 
(10.1) 
70.7 
(13.8) 
81.5 
(5.9) 
Household Income      
  Less than $ 25,000 14.5 
(5.8) 
22.2 
(8.1) 
51.1 
(11.2) 
64.7 
(15.1) 
73.4 
(6.2) 
  $25,000 -  $44,999 18.9 
(7.2) 
28.2 
(8.2) 
58.0 
(12.2) 
73.0 
(17.0) 
81.9 
(7.1) 
  $45,000 -  $74,999 19.2 
(6.7) 
31.0 
(8.6) 
66.1 
(11.9) 
76.7 
(16.8) 
84.1 
(7.4) 
  $75,000 or more 22.5 
(6.0) 
34.7 
(7.8) 
65.2 
(11.1) 
77.2 
(15.1) 
86.0 
(6.7) 
Residence Area      
  Rural  22.4 
(7.6) 
31.4 
(9.2) 
61.1 
(12.2) 
73.8 
(16.3) 
81.9 
(7.3) 
  Urban 17.4 
(5.9) 
28.4 
(7.7) 
60.2 
(11.4) 
73.1 
(15.9) 
81.6 
(6.6) 
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 Table 3. Distribution of 14- and 15-year-olds’ employment status of eventual high school dropouts and high school graduates in   
 1994-1997 (N=3384)  
 
 
0=ijW : 
Not Working  
1=ijW : 
Working within FLSA 
hours limits 
2=ijW :  
Occasionally violating 
FLSA hours limits  
3=ijW :  
Frequently violating 
FLSA hours limits 
(All children) Dropouts HS graduates Dropouts HS graduates Dropouts HS graduates Dropouts HS graduates 
School months         
At age 14 85.3 81.1 7.6 12.5 4.1 3.3 3.3 3.2 
At age 15 76.4 70.7 9.2 15.8 4.8 4.8 9.7 8.7 
Summer months         
At age 14 84.1 80.4 14.3 18.6 1.0 0.4 0.7 0.6 
At age 15 77.7 68.8 20.6 29.1 0.2 0.8 1.6. 1.4 
(Working children) Dropouts HS graduates Dropouts HS graduates Dropouts HS graduates Dropouts HS graduates 
School months         
At age 14 NA NA 50.6 66.0 27.5 17.2 22.0 16.7 
At age 15 NA NA 38.9 54.0 20.1 16.4 41.0 29.6 
Summer months         
At age 14 NA NA 89.7 95.0 6.2 2.0 4.1 3.0 
At age 15 NA NA 91.9 93.1 0.7 2.6 7.4 4.4 
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 Table 4. Distribution of school-year employment status of eventual high school dropouts and high school graduates while their age  
 14 and 15 in 1994-1999 (Ndrop=608 and Nhs=3384) 
 
 0=ijW : 
 
Not working 
1=ijW : 
Working within FLSA  
hours limits 
3or  2=ijW : 
Violating FLSA 
hours limits 
 Dropouts HS Graduates c. Dropouts HS Graduates 
c. Dropouts HS Graduates  
c. 
Total 71.6 66.6 * 11.3 17.7 ** 17.1 15.7  
Gender          
  Female 74.9 70.5 ** 9.2 15.7 *** 15.9 13.8  
  Male 69.0 62.2  13.0 19.9  *** 18.0 17.9  
Race or Ethnicity          
  Black 80.7 76.2  9.9  9.7    9.4  14.2 * 
  Hispanic 78.8 74.5  6.4 12.8 *** 14.8 12.8 *** 
  White 60.9 59.6 ** 15.8 22.9  23.3 17.4 ** 
8
th
 Grade GPA          
  Less than 2.50 74.8 68.0 *** 11.4 17.3 *** 13.8 14.7  
  2.51 – 3.50 60.8 66.8 * 12.4 16.7  26.9 16.5 *** 
  3.51 – 4.00 90.5 64.4 ** 4.8  19.9 * 4.8  15.7  
Family Structure          
  Two-biological  parents 66.4 65.1  14.3 19.8 ** 19.3 15.1 * 
  Not two-biological  parents 74.3 69.1 ** 9.8  14.4 *** 15.9 16.6  
Father’s Education          
  HS dropout 72.7 72.8  11.5 12.3  15.8 15.0  
  HS graduate 68.4 63.2  12.0 18.6 * 19.7 18.2  
  Some College 57.9 61.3  15.8 22.4  26.3 16.4 * 
  College and higher 60.0 64.5  15.0 22.3  25.0 13.2  
Mother’s Education          
  HS dropout 76.6 76.4  6.3 10.2 * 17.1 13.5  
  HS graduate 69.8 63.0 ** 13.2 18.2 * 17.0 18.8  
  Some College 67.0 64.5  19.4 20.4  13.6 15.1  
  College and higher 61.1 65.7  16.7 20.3  22.2 14.1  
 Note. c Test of difference in means between high school dropout and high school graduate samples.  
          *** Significant at 1% level,  ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level.  
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 Table 4. (continued) 
 
 0=ijW : 
 
Not working 
1=ijW : 
Working within FLSA  
hours limits 
3or  2=ijW : 
Violating FLSA 
hours limits 
 Dropouts HS Graduates c. Dropouts HS Graduates 
c. Dropouts HS Graduates  
c. 
Household Income          
 Less than $ 25,000 77.7 74.0  9.5  12.6  12.7 13.4  
$25,000 -  $44,999 63.6 67.6  11.4 14.8  25.0 17.5 ** 
$45,000 -  $74,999 64.7 64.9  17.2 19.3  18.1 15.8  
$ 75,000 or more 61.4 60.6  13.6 23.7  25.0 15.9  
Residence Area          
Rural  71.3 63.7 * 13.5 17.7  15.2 18.6  
Urban 71.6 67.8 * 10.7 17.6 * 17.6 14.6 * 
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 Table 5. Ordered probit estimation of employment status on the rigor of state child labor laws and control variables 
 
Variable Employment status at age 14 Employment status at age 15 
Work permit requirement 
under age 18 )1( =WD  
-.023 
(.049) 
 
 
-.028 
(.049) 
-.019 
(.044) 
 -.022 
(.044) 
Compulsory schooling attendance 
above age 16 )1( =SD  
 -.084 
(.051) 
-.085 
(.051) 
 -.034 
(.045) 
-.036 
(.045) 
8th grade GPA .012 
(.037) 
.011 
(.036) 
.010 
(.037) 
.011 
(.033) 
.010 
(.033) 
.010 
(.033) 
Male .333*** 
(.050) 
.334*** 
(.050) 
.333*** 
(.050) 
.167*** 
(.045) 
.167*** 
(.045) 
.167*** 
(.045) 
Black -.348*** 
(.070) 
-.344*** 
(.070) 
-.344*** 
(.070) 
-.410*** 
(.061) 
-.404*** 
(.061) 
-.405*** 
(.061) 
Hispanic -.245*** 
(.073) 
-.227*** 
(.074) 
-.225*** 
(.074) 
-.412*** 
(.067) 
-.406*** 
(.068) 
-.404*** 
(.068) 
Urban -.110** 
(.054) 
-.109** 
(.054) 
-.109** 
(-.054) 
-.021 
(.049) 
-.021 
(.049) 
-.021 
(.049) 
Log household income(10,000$) .003 
(.006) 
.003 
(.006) 
.003 
(.006) 
.012** 
(.005) 
.011** 
(.005) 
.011** 
(.005) 
Father education -.002 
(.006) 
-.002 
(.006) 
-.002 
(.006) 
-.001 
(.005) 
-.001 
(.005) 
-.001 
(.005) 
Mother education -.002 
(.007) 
-.002 
(.007) 
-.003 
(.007) 
-.009 
(.006) 
-.009 
(.006) 
-.010 
(.006) 
Broken family -.132 
(.072) 
-.132 
(.071) 
-.134 
(.072) 
.064 
(.063) 
.065 
(.063) 
.063 
(.063) 
Constant -.820 -.784 -.765 -.459 -.449 -.434 
µ1 .656*** 
(.030) 
.656*** 
(.030) 
.656*** 
(.030) 
.570*** 
(.023) 
.570*** 
(.023) 
.570** 
(.023) 
µ2 .998*** 
(.041) 
.998*** 
(.041) 
.999*** 
(.041) 
.829*** 
(.028) 
.830*** 
(.028) 
.830** 
(.028) 
Log-Likelihood -2143.2 -2472.7 -2141.8 -2969.5 -2969.3 -2969.2 
Pseudo R2 .026 .026 .026 .018 .018 .018 
N 3384 3384 3384 3384 3384 3384 
Test of H0: two state laws are not 
jointly significant 
  Chi2 = 3.03 
      p =.220 
  Chi2 = .81 
      p =.666 
 Note. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level,* Significant at 10% level. 
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 Table 6. Marginal effect of rigor of state child labor law on employment status 
 
 
0=ijW : 
 
Not working 
1=ijW : 
Working within 
FLSA hours limits 
2=ijW :  
Occasionally 
violating FLSA 
hours limits  
3=ijW :  
Frequently violating 
FLSA hours limits 
At age 14     
(DW = 1) – (DW = 0) .006 -.004 -.001 -.002 
(DS = 1 ) – (DS = 0)  .023 -.013 -.005 -.006 
(DW =1 & DS = 1)-( DW = 0 & DS = 0) .031 -.017 -.006 -.007 
At age 15     
(DW = 1) – (DW = 0) .007 -.003 -.001 -.003 
(DS = 1 ) – (DS = 0)  .013 -.005 -.002 -.006 
(DW =1 & DS = 1)-( DW = 0 & DS = 0) .021 -.008 -.004 -.009 
 Note. DW and DS are dummy variables reflecting the rigor of state child labor laws in terms of work permit requirement and compulsory school attendance  
 respectively. 
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 Table 7. Estimates of state child labor laws on highs school completion, college entry and high school GPA 
 
Variables High school completion1  College entry1 High school GPA2 
Work permit requirement under age 18 )1( =wD  .013 
(.009) 
.030* 
(.017) 
-.005 
(.019) 
Compulsory schooling attendance above age 16 )1( =sD   .012 
(.009) 
-.003 
(.018) 
.062*** 
(.019) 
8th grade GPA .107*** 
(.007) 
.262*** 
(.013) 
.611*** 
(.013) 
Male -.015* 
(.009) 
-.068*** 
(.017) 
-.115*** 
(.019) 
Black .036*** 
(.009) 
.066*** 
(.022) 
-.116*** 
(.025) 
Hispanic .020* 
(.011) 
-.002 
(.025) 
-.097*** 
(.027) 
Urban -.017* 
(.010) 
.054*** 
(.020) 
-.066*** 
(.021) 
Log household income ($10,000) .014*** 
(.002) 
.028*** 
(.003) 
.011*** 
(.002) 
Father education .002** 
(.001) 
.003* 
(.002) 
.006*** 
(.002) 
Mother education .006*** 
(.001) 
.017*** 
(.002) 
.005** 
(.002) 
Broken family -.047*** 
(.013) 
-.077*** 
(.024) 
-.016 
(.027) 
Constant   .962*** 
(.058) 
R2   0.442 
Pseudo R2 0.235 0.211  
N 3992 3992 3992 
Test of H0: two state laws are not jointly significant Chi2 = 4.06 
      p =.132 
Chi2 = 3.18 
      p =.204 
F = 5.36 
p =.005 
 Note. 1 Probit regression for marginal effect 2 OLS regression 
             Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1% level,  ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level..  
  
3
4
 Table 8. Estimates of employment status on high school completion, college entry and high school GPA 
 
Variables 
High school 
completion1 
College entry1 High school GPA2 
A. Employment status at age 14    
1=ijW : Working within FLSA hours   
               limits 
.037*** 
(.011) 
.035 
(.027) 
.011 
(.029) 
2=ijW : Occasionally violating FLSA 
               hours limits 
-.058** 
(.031) 
.005 
(.047) 
-.066 
(.052) 
3=ijW : Frequently violating FLSA 
               hours limits 
.007 
(.023) 
.003 
(.048) 
-.024 
(.053) 
    
B. Employment status at age 15    
1=ijW : Working within FLSA hours 
               limits 
.025** 
(.012) 
.032 
(.025) 
.020 
(.027) 
2=ijW : Occasionally violating FLSA  
               hours limits 
-.002 
(.020) 
.074* 
(.039) 
-.026 
(.044) 
3=ijW : Frequently violating FLSA 
               hours limits 
-.013 
(.016) 
-.039 
(.031) 
-.024 
(.033) 
 Note. 1 Marginal effects are reported from a probit regression  
           2 OLS regression. 
             Group of students who didn’t work at all during the time is used as a reference. 
             All regressions included the other demographic variables used in Table 5. 
             Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level.  
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 Table 9. Estimates of employment status on high school completion, college entry and high school GPA using index value 
 
 High school1 
completion 
College entry1 High school GPA 
Predicted index value for working at age 14 .427 -.147 -.794*** 
 (.46) (.08) (.42) 
R2   .441 
Pseudo R2 .234 .210  
    
Predicted index value for working at age 15 -.065 .067 -1.327 
 (.08) (.04) (.82) 
R2   .441 
Pseudo R2 .234 .210  
 Note. 1 Marginal effects are reported from a probit regression  
           2 OLS regression. 
                   |Z| statistics are reported in parenthesis.  
             All regressions included the other control variables used in Table 5.        
             *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. 
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 Appendix 1. Child labor provisions in FLSA 
 
    
Age Permissible jobs Hours of work Times of day 
13 or younger Casual free-lance jobs such as 
babysitting and delivering 
newspapers 
NA NA 
14 and 15 Non-manufacturing, non-mining, 
non-hazardous jobs1 
Up to 3 hours on a school day and 
18 hours in a school week; up to 8 
hours on a non-school day and 40 
hours in a non school week 
Between 7am and 7pm except 
from June 1 through Labor Day, 
when evening hours are 
extended to 9 pm 
16 and 17 Non-hazardous jobs No restrictions No restrictions 
    
Age Permissible jobs Hours of work Times of day 
Under 12 years  Jobs on farms owned or operated by 
parent(s) or non-hazardous jobs on 
farms 
Outside of school hours With a parent’s written consent 
or on the same farm as the 
parent(s) 
12 and 13 Non-hazardous jobs Outside of school hours With a parent’s written consent 
or on the same farm as the 
parent(s) 
14 and 15 Non-hazardous jobs Outside of school hours  
16 and older Any jobs Unlimited   
 Note. 1 For example, occupations involving transportation, construction, warehousing, or communication, or occupations involving the use of 
             power-driven machinery are regarded as hazardous jobs. 
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 Appendix 2. Distribution of states across age of work permit requirement 
 
Age required for work 
permit 
States affected Total number 
No Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada1, Oregon, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Wyoming 
13 
Under age 16 Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
Virginia, West Virginia 
22 
Under age 18 Alabama, Alaska2, California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, 
Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Washington, Wisconsin 
16 
 Note. 1.Working at under age 14 is required work permit. Since this study deals with working of age 14 and older, this state comes under no 
              requirement. 
                 2 Under age 17 or under age 19 if employer licensed to sell alcohol. Under considering the weight of those two terms, this state is included 
              in this category.  
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 Appendix 3. Distribution of states across age of legal dropout  
 
Age allowed to leave 
school 
States affected Total number 
Age 16 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, 
Wyoming 
29 
Age 17 Arkansas, Maine, Mississippi, Nevada, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
Tennessee 
7 
Age 18 California, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Nebraska, New 
Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, 
Wisconsin 
15 
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 Appendix 4. Marginal effect of rigor of state child labor law on employment status 
 
 
0=ijW : 
 
Not Working 
1=ijW  : 
Working within FLSA 
hours limits  
2=ijW  : 
Occasionally violating 
FLSA hours limits  
3=ijW : 
Frequently violating 
FLSA hours limits 
At age 14     
D
W= 0 .816 .124 .031 .029 
D
W= 1 .823 .120 .030 .027 
D
S= 0 .809 .128 .033 .031 
D
S= 1 .832 .115 .028 .025 
D
W= 0 & DS= 0 .805 .130 .033 .032 
D
W= 1 & DS= 0 .813 .126 .032 .030 
D
W= 0 & DS= 1 .829 .117 .029 .026 
D
W= 1 & DS= 1 .836 .113 .027 .024 
At age 15     
D
W= 0 .710 .159 .047 .084 
D
W= 1 .717 .157 .046 .081 
D
S= 0 .708 .160 .047 .085 
D
S= 1 .720 .155 .045 .079 
D
W= 0 & DS= 0 .703 .162 .048 .087 
D
W= 1 & DS= 0 .711 .159 .047 .083 
D
W= 0 & DS= 1 .717 .157 .046 .081 
D
W= 1 & DS= 1 .724 .154 .045 .077 
 Note. DW and DS are dummy variables reflecting the rigor of state child labor laws in terms of work permit requirement and compulsory school  
           attendance respectively. 
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 Appendix 5. Definition of variables and summary statistics (N=3992) 
 
Variables Definition Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Dependent      
HS complete Dummy: one if having completed high school, zero if otherwise 84.7 .359 0 1 
HS GPA Overall marks they received from the 9th to the 12th grade. 
It ranged from 1(below D) to 8(Almost A) and translated into 4.0   
2.86 .783 .5 4 
College entry Dummy: one if having attended college, zero if otherwise .572 .495 0 1 
Work status14 Employment intensity ordered response representing progressively higher 
values at age 14 
.280 .678 0 3 
Work status15 Employment intensity ordered response representing progressively higher 
values at age 15 
.508 .935 0 3 
Independent      
Work permit Dummy: one if state required work permit under 18, zero if otherwise .503 .500 0 1 
School leave  Dummy: one if state required students to stay above 16,  
zero if otherwise 
.463 .499 0 1 
8th grades Overall marks they received at 8th grade. 
It ranged from 1(below D) to 8(Almost A) and translated into 4.0 scale 
3.04 .755 .5 4 
Male Dummy: one if male, zero if female .481 .500 0 1 
Black Dummy: one if black, zero if otherwise .246 .431 0 1 
Hispanic Dummy: one if Hispanic, zero if otherwise .190 .392 0 1 
Urban Dummy: one living in urban areas, zero if living in rural areas .715 .452 0 1 
HH income Average household income during the last 5 years (10,000dollars) 5.44 4.57 0 32.9 
Father education Biological father or residential father’s highest education level 
It ranged from 1(1st grade) to 20(8th year college) 
13.1 3.26 2 20 
Mother education Biological mother or residential mother’s highest education level 
It ranged from 1(1st grade) to 20(8th year college) 
12.8 2.95 1 20 
Broken family Dummy: if there is at least one missing biological parents, zero if students 
living with both biological parents. 
.439 .496 0 1 
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Chapter 3. High School Employment, School Performance, and  
 
College Entry 
 
Abstract 
The proportion of U.S. high school students working during the school year ranges 
from 23% in the freshman year to 75% in the senior year. This study estimates the effects of 
working while in school on probability of dropout, high school grade point average, and the 
probability of attending college. Variation in individual date of birth and in state truancy laws 
along with the strength of local demand for low-skill labor are used as instruments for 
endogenous work hours during the high school career. Instrumental variable estimates 
indicate that working more hours in high school does not affect high school academic 
performance. However, increased high school work intensity raises the likelihood of 
completing high school but lowers the probability of going to college. These results are 
similar for boys and girls, and so working in school does not explain the gap in college entry 
between men and women. 
3.1. Introduction 
It is common for high school students in the United States to work during the school 
year.11 Data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) indicate that 
over the 1997-2003 period, the percentage of students who worked at least one week during 
the school year was 23% for freshmen; 45% for sophomores; 66% for juniors and 75% for 
                                                 
11 Youth labor force attachment has been declining recently. The October labor force participation rate for 16- 
to 19-year-olds dropped over the 1994-2003 period from 50.4% to 42.2%. (Current Population Survey, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics) 
  
42 
 
seniors. This study examines whether working while in high school has any adverse 
consequences for school outcomes. 
With such high percentages of working students, many must feel that combining 
school and work is innocuous or even beneficial to children, at least for older children. 
Nevertheless, governments appear to believe there are adverse consequences for working at 
younger ages. The federal government limits the number of hours that children under 16 can 
work, and state and local governments may place additional age and hours restrictions on 
working youth. However, other state governments have concluded that combining school and 
work enhances human capital development, and have implemented programs to encourage 
working while in school in the belief that such programs improve school-to-career transitions.  
Academic studies have also yielded inconsistent evidence regarding the effect of high 
school work on academic performance. Some find no effect or even a positive effect of 
working on schooling outcomes while others find negative effects. One potential reason is 
that studies may have very noisy measures of work, basing the measure on only a 
representative week or else confusing work during the school year with work in the summer. 
Another problem is that working while in school and school performance are joint decisions, 
suggesting that estimates must correct for the likely endogeneity of working while in school. 
It is highly likely that if children are doing poorly in school, working hours will be cut or 
curtailed entirely.  
Our study examines how cumulative work history while in high school affects 
schooling outcomes. We also use variation in state regulations regarding truancy ages and 
birth dates along with the strength of local demand for unskilled labor as plausible 
instruments to correct for endogenous work. We use several measures of schooling outcomes 
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to examine whether conclusions regarding working while in school are sensitive to the 
outcome used in the analysis. 
Our results indicate that more intensive employment experiences while attending high 
school have a small and insignificant effect on high school GPA. However, more intensive 
work has a small negative effect on probability of high school dropout and a large and 
statistically significant negative impact on the probability of attending college. A 10% 
increase in cumulative hours of work in high school leads to a 1.4% decreased likelihood of 
entering college. However, despite the fact that boys work more hours than girls in high 
school, girls’ college entry is more adversely affected by work, and so working while in high 
school does not explain boys’ lower likelihood of entering college. 
The format of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we briefly review past 
research focusing on the relationship between employment experience during the school year 
and school performance. In section 3.3, we provide a model relating school performance and 
employment experience and validate instrumental variables. In Section 3.4, we describe the 
data and present descriptive statistics. In Section 3.5, we provide empirical results and 
sensitivity analysis. In Section 3.6, we summarize the results and discuss the policy 
implications as conclusions. 
3.2. Past Research 
 Previous studies that ignore the potential endogeneity of working while in school 
have yielded mixed results about the effect on measures of school performance such as high 
school GPA, dropout, or continuing education after high school. Depending on the 
specification, Steinberg et al. (1982) found either no correlation or a positive correlation 
between working while in school and Grade Point Average. D’Amico (1984) concluded that 
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school-year employment didn’t affect high school rank. Warren et al. (2000) found that 
working during high school didn’t affect curriculum choices or grades. 
 Modest working schedules do not appear to have serious consequences for academic 
achievement. Lillydahl (1990) reported that working up to 13.5 hours per week has a positive 
effect on GPA. Mortimer et al. (1996) found that high school seniors who worked less than 
20 hours per week have higher grades compared to non-working students. D’Amico (1984) 
and Tienda and Ahituv (1996) reported that school work lowered the probability of dropping 
out. 
Other studies found harmful effects of school-year work on high school academic 
performance, particularly with more intensive work schedules. Greenberg and Steinberg 
(1986) reported that working over 20 hours per week lowers high school GPA. Stern (1995) 
found that working more than 15 hours per week has a negative effect on grades, time spent 
on homework and the likelihood of completion high school. Eckstein and Wolpin (1998) 
found a small negative effect on academic performance of employment during high school. 
Some studies find racial or ethnic differences in the estimated effect of school-year work on 
academic achievements. Oettinger (1999) reported that working more than 20 hours per week 
lowers high school GPA of black and Hispanic youth but not of whites. 
 While hours of work can affect how well a student performs in school, school 
performance could also affect how many hours a student works.12 Consequently, it is 
necessary to control for factors that affect the probability of working while in school in order 
                                                 
12 Warren et al (1990) and Oettinger (1999) tested for but failed to find a reverse causal relationship in which 
academic performance influences on the employment during school. However, their tests of reverse causality 
will be biased if school attainment and work are jointly determined. 
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to determine how working affects school performance. Tyler (2003) examined the effect of 
working while in the last year of high school on twelfth-grade school test scores. When work 
is instrumented by variation in state child labor laws, he found a larger and significant 
decline in high school test scores relative to least squares estimates. Stinebrickner and 
Stinebrickner (2003) found similar effects on first-year college students. Random assignment 
of job types across students created exogenous variation in hours worked per week. They 
found that working three hours more per week cost about one-half of a grade point in first 
semester grades.  
 Neither of these papers examined whether there were cumulative effects of work 
while in school that might magnify or moderate the short-term relationship between work 
and achievement. In fact, most studies of high school work and academic performance used 
the number of hours worked per week over a short time period, typically in the week or 
month prior to the interview date. Of the exceptions, D’Amico (1984) generally found 
working regularly did not affect school performance regardless of work intensity. Ruhm 
(1997) found that working more intensively during high school increased earnings later in 
life. Both of these studies treat increased work intensity as exogenous, making it impossible 
to tell if their results might be due to unmeasured differences among students that cause some 
students to work more than others and that are also correlated with school performance or 
later earnings. 
 Recently, Rothstein (2007) found a small negative impact of current and past work 
while in school on high school GPA. Using a slightly different empirical strategy, our paper 
obtains results similar to Rothstein’s findings on high school GPA. In addition, we find that 
working while in school has a small positive effect on the likelihood of completing high 
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school but a larger negative effect on college entry. When evaluated at sample means, these 
findings are of similar magnitude for boys and girls. 
3.3. Model  
      A. Theoretical background 
 A household is comprised of a parent and a teen-age child. The parent is assumed to 
make decisions so as to maximize household utility from consumption )(C , and from the 
students’ school performance )(S . School performance is related to the child’s capacity for 
future human capital investments and earnings, and so S could be viewed as an index of 
expected future child wealth. The parent selects child time allocation and current 
consumption so as to maximize utility U=U (S, C). The child’s time, normalized to unity, is 
divided between schooling )( ST and child labor )( WT .
13 The child’s school performance 
depends on the number of hours spent studying during high school and a vector of students’ 
individual, household, and community characteristics )(X . Numerous studies have shown 
that children with wealthier parents perform better in school. Child learning also depends on 
unobserved child’s individual ability or motivation )( Cµ which may affect child time in 
school and work. 
 A high school student who works outside the household is assumed to earn an 
exogenous local market wage )( CW . The parent’s labor supply is inelastic and yields an 
exogenous income )( AW . The earned household income )( WCA TWW +  is used to purchase 
                                                 
13 We are implicitly assuming that other uses of child time such as leisure consumption, household chores, or 
time spent on personal care (hygiene, sleeping, eating) are exogenous. Adding these activities into the model 
will not affect the reduced form solution to the optimization problem provided the opportunity cost of leisure or 
personal care time is the same as for schooling, and so we exclude these activities from the model for simplicity. 
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consumption goods at price normalized to unity and to purchase schooling that is priced at SP . 
The price of schooling is assumed to be altered by government policy on truancy age and age 
of school entry. For example, if state compulsory school attendance laws mandate that 
students living in the state must stay in school at an older age, the opportunity cost of 
schooling is lower because the option of working during school hours is removed. State 
policies on the minimum age at which children can enter school alter the average age and 
opportunity costs of schooling as well. Parents may be induced to send their children to 
private school to avoid age restrictions. 
 Incorporating these various elements, the parent’s problem is to maximize   
 ),( SCUU =           (1) 
subject to the household budget constraint   
 SSWCA TPCTWW +=+         (2) 
and the school performance production function  
 ( , , , )W A CS S T W Xµ= .           (3) 
Assuming interior solutions and considering child’s time constraint, the tradeoff between 
household consumption and educational investments on child is described by14 
 )( S
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.       (4) 
The parent allocates child time to school so that the marginal utility from current 
consumption purchased by the last hour of child time spent working is equal to the marginal 
                                                 
14 In addition, parents’ concave utility function implies that educational production function has the usual 
properties: 0'>s and 0'' <s  with respect to time spent on studying. 
  
48 
 
utility from the last hour of child time spent in school net of the lost utility from consumption. 
The solution of this problem yields a reduced form equation for child time spent in work:  
 ),,,,( CSCAW XPWWTT µ= .        (5) 
      B. Empirical strategy 
 Our empirical work focuses on the linear approximations to equations (3) and (5). 
 '0W A A C C P S X TT W W P Xα α α α α ε= + + + + +       (6) 
 '0 W W A A X SS T W Xβ β β β ε= + + + +        (7) 
where the error terms will be of the form ; ,k k C k k T Sε γ µ ξ= + = . Errors will have a 
component related to unobserved abilities and a purely random component. Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) will only yield a consistent estimate of school-year work on school 
achievement, Wβ in (7), if X and WT  and are uncorrelated with the error Sε . But this will 
only happen if 0Tγ =  in (6), which is unlikely given that Cµ  alters the optimal allocation of 
WT  in (5). For example, suppose that teens with better endowments of Cµ  earn higher grade 
point averages. Suppose also that parents allocate child time to work activities only if they 
are doing well in school and so Cµ and WT  are positively correlated. Then the OLS estimate 
of the effect of work on high school GPA will be upward-biased. This could explain why 
some studies using OLS found no effect or even positive effects of school-year work on 
measured school achievement. Of course, the bias could go in the other direction if less able 
teens are more likely to work.  
 We use an instrumental variables strategy to address the estimation problem. The 
theory suggests that factors that shift the value of child time, CW , or the price of child time in 
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school,  SP , will be good candidates for factors that shift the likelihood a child works but that 
do not directly affect schooling performance.  
      C. Instrumental variables 
The strength of the local market for low-skilled labor is measured by average county 
retail sector earnings, as reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, during the period 
when the student is in high school. Higher average retail earnings should induce more high 
school students to work part-time while in school. Cameron and Taber (2004), Black et al 
(2005) and Rothstein (2007) found that local low-skilled earnings can significantly affect 
years of schooling across areas and time periods. Compared to other industries, the retail 
industry has the advantage that earnings and employment are reported for almost every 
county and that it is a heavy user of youth employees.15 As an example, eating and drinking 
establishments are the most common employers of high school aged youth (Rothstein, 2001).  
We use variation in legal restrictions on child time across states to approximate 
variations in the cost of child time in school. Every state stipulates an age at which students 
can legally leave school. The longer a child is required to stay enrolled in school, the less 
time potentially available for work. Students in states with lower dropout ages might be 
expected to work more during high school, if only because a young truancy age makes it 
more difficult for authorities to assess whether a working child is legally out of school. 
Similarly, restrictions on the age at which children can work suggest that children who enter 
high school at a younger age are less likely to work while in school. The Fair Labor Standard 
                                                 
15 A variety of industries were investigated for inclusion such as agriculture, wholesale trade, service and 
construction suggested by Cameron and Taber (2004). 
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Act (FLSA) restricts work opportunities for children under the age of 16.16 Students who 
enter high school at older ages are not subject to the FLSA work limitations, although stricter 
state rules might still apply. 
 Similarly, the age at which a child enters high school may affect his decision to work. 
The expected age at grade 9 is computed based on the age entering 1st grade. In our sample, 
68 % of students entered high school at age 14 and 25 % at age 15. All of these students can 
legally work while in high school and could drop out before completing high school, 
although when these laws take effect varies by age of the child and by the state in which the 
child resides. The legal drop out age by state is reported in Table 1 (National Center for 
School Engagement, 2003). Of the 43 states included in our sample, 26 states require 
students to remain in school until age 16; 5 states until age 17; and 12 states until age 18. 
Because school and work entry decisions are related to a child’s age, random 
variation in birth dates can affect the ages a child attends high school. If true, month of birth 
can affect the likelihood and intensity of working while in high school. Figure 1 shows the 
variation in the portion of students entering high school by ages 13 and 14, by birth month. 
Students born in the last quarter of the year are the most likely to enter high school by age 14 
and many enter at age 13. Probability of early entry drops sharply for those born in the 
                                                 
16 The Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA) limits the number of hours and the type of work for 14- and 15- year 
olds. They may work outside school hours in various non-manufacturing, non-mining, non-hazardous jobs 
under the following conditions:  no more than 3 hours on a school day, 18 hours in a school week, 8 hours on a 
non-school day, or 40 hours during a non-school week. Since age 14 is a typical starting age for high school, we 
can interpret the FLSA as allowing high school students to work with modest restrictions in terms of time and 
type of work.  
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months before the start of the school-year. Those born in September are 25 percent more 
likely to enter school before age 15 than are those born in August.17 
3.4. Data 
 The main data source for this study is the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY97) consisting of 8,984 individuals born between 1980 and 1984. We make use 
of data up to the 2002 survey, the last year for which data were available. To concentrate on 
students who could have completed high school, we restrict the sample to students who 
enrolled in grade 9 by 1998 and who were born before 1984. Observations with missing 
values in key variables of this study are also excluded. Our working sample includes 3380 
youths who obtained a high school diploma and 607 high school dropouts. 
The NLSY97 collects retrospective employment data from the interview date back to 
the preceding interview date. This data include the beginning and ending dates of all jobs, all 
gaps in work within the same job and usual hours spent at work on each job. Based on this 
information, we generated weekly hours of work for each student both during the school year 
and in the summer. For some of our analysis, we also used aggregated work hours over time.  
The NLSY97 provides a wealth of useful information on household factors that may 
be correlated with labor market behavior and educational experiences. It includes gender, 
ethnicity, household income, family structure, parent’s highest education level, school 
performance and county of residence. Our analysis utilizes the restricted-use geocoded 
edition of the NLSY97 to identify each student’s county of residence. That allowed us to 
                                                 
17 Angrist and Krueger (1991) and Rothstein (2007) also used timing of birth to help identify years of schooling 
and child labor, respectively.  
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merge in indicators of local county labor market conditions and state compulsory schooling 
attendance laws.  
Table 2 reports weighted sample means of the variables used in the analysis, sorted 
by student status (high school dropouts; terminating high school graduates; and high school 
graduates who enter college). About 15% of the sample is high school dropouts; 28% ended 
schooling with the high school degree; and 56% entered college after completing high school. 
As one would expect, the high school graduate subset performs better in school. High school 
graduates had average GPAs of around 3.0, whereas dropouts had average GPAs of 2.1.18 
Employment intensity during the first two years of high school also differs between the two 
samples. On average, dropouts worked 180 hours more during the first two school years than 
did high school graduates who worked while in school. High school dropouts also worked 
around 85 hours more during the first summer of high school. Nevertheless, the summary 
data suggests other reasons why more intense work might be correlated with dropout. 
Dropouts come from poorer households than do high school graduates, and so the higher 
work hours of dropouts may reflect other observable or unobservable differences between the 
two samples. 
3.5. Empirical Results 
      A. Labor supply while in high school 
We are relying on our labor supply equation (6) to identify school-year working hours in 
our human capital production equation (7). We first demonstrate that our child labor supply 
shifters can significantly influence hours of work while in high school. Research has demonstrated 
                                                 
18 The NLSY reports high school grades on a scale from 0 to 13. These scores correspond to approximate grades 
such as “mostly C” or “mixed A with B” and so on. These approximate grades were converted into a  4.0 scale. 
“Mostly C” is converted to 2.0 and “Mixed A with B” is converted to 3.5. 
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that instruments that are only weakly associated with the endogenous variables invalidate the 
estimation method (Bound et al. 1995). We regress cumulative hours of work during high school 
on the expected age at which students enter high school, the legal drop out age by compulsory 
schooling attendance laws in state, local average earnings per worker in retail industry during their 
high school year, month at which students were born, the square of the month, and a number of 
other control variables. For comparison purposes, the first column of Table 3 contains the 
regression incorporating only the vector of exogenous control variables.  
The first and second rows in column 2 of Table 3 show month of birth has a quadratic 
relationship with hours of work during high school. Cumulative hours are decreasing in 
month of birth until June, but then increase for students born in the second half of the year. 
The difference apparently reflects differences across birth months in the probability of 
entering high school at ages where work is illegal. As shown in Figure 1, the probability if 
entering high school before age 15 rises from September through April and then falls 
thereafter. Entering high school at an older age has a dramatic effect on child labor supply: 
delaying age of entry by one year raises hours worked in high school by 50.7%. Black and 
Hispanic children are less likely to work than white children with similar home situations. 
However, poverty does influence child labor. Probability of working decreases as household 
income and parental education increase, while children from single-parent homes work more.  
In the third column, legal dropout age is included. Individuals in states with truancy 
ages one year older work 12% fewer hours during high school. The fourth column shows that 
adding local earnings to the third column specification increases the model’s explanatory 
power. Average county retail earnings of students’ school year have a positive and significant 
effect on hours worked in high school. A 10% increase in average retail earnings increases 
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cumulative hours of work while in school by 8% on average. The null hypothesis that the 
coefficients on the set of instruments used are jointly zero can easily be rejected with an F- 
statistic of 9.9, providing evidence that local labor market conditions and compulsory 
schooling attendance laws are related to the high school students’ work. 
It also appears that these instrumental variables are not directly correlated with school 
performance. Though it is not a definitive test, the fifth column of Table 3 provides the 
results when high school grade point average is regressed on individual characteristics and 
the instrumental variables used in this study. We failed to reject the null hypothesis that the 
instruments have no joint influence on grades at all levels of significance.  
      B. Impact of working while in school on school outcomes 
 Table 4 presents the OLS and IV estimates of β from equation (7). The estimated 
effect of employment on schooling outcomes is shown in the first row of each column. The 
OLS estimate of the direct academic performance effect of work during high school year is 
very small but statistically significant. It implies that a 10 % decrease in cumulative hours of 
work during high school would increase high school GPA by around 0.02.19 As we 
mentioned earlier, OLS estimates would be biased from unobserved ability or measurement 
error of hours of work.  
The IV estimates in the second column is obtained when labor supply during high 
school is instrumented with expected age entering high school, the month of birth, and the 
square of the month. It shows that the IV point estimate of having a part time job is about 100 
percent larger than the OLS estimates in absolute value but is not significant. The literal 
                                                 
19 The calculation is based on ∆ HS GPA ≅  )
100
(
β
(%∆ Work hours). 
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interpretation is that a 10% in hours worked during high school lowers high school GPA by 
0.039 points, although the estimate is not statistically significant. The same results are 
obtained when we use different sets of instruments.20 Both OLS and IV estimates indicate 
that cumulative hours of work during high school do not greatly hamper high school 
academic performance.21  
The results also show that, holding family background fixed, girls outperform boys by 
0.25 points in high school GPA. Gaps of comparable magnitude are found between Whites 
and Blacks or Hispanics. Living with richer and better educated parents raises GPA 
substantially with an average 0.8 points difference between students with college educated 
parents compared to students with high school educated parents. To put the child labor effect 
in perspective, two years of parental education more than compensates for the lost GPA from 
working 10% longer hours in high school. 
 Since we have more instruments than endogenous variables, our model is over-
identified. The test of over-identifying restrictions produces a χ2 statistic of at most 3.81. 
Thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error 
term. 
  The same approach used above is applied to examine the effect of work during high 
school on the likelihood of attending college. Table 5 presents the probit estimates and two 
stage probit estimates. The marginal effects are reported as evaluated at the mean of each 
variable. The uncorrected estimate treating work hours as exogenous suggests that a ten 
                                                 
20 Various definitions of birth month were tried. For example, instead of numbering months starting in January, 
an alternative specification numbered the months starting in September to reflect the school year. Another 
alternative replaced the numbered months by a series of  11 birth month dummy variables. Results are invariant 
to the definition used. (See Appendix 1.a and 1.b for high school GPA and college entry respectively) 
21 We also found there is no different effect across male youth and female youth. (see Appendix 2) 
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percent increase in hours worked during high school decreases the probability of entering 
college by 0.2%, a statistically significant but numerically small effect.22 The IV estimates 
obtained using a two stage probit correcting for the endogeneity of labor supply finds a more 
substantial effect. A 10 % increase in employment intensity during high school lowers the 
probability of college entry by about 1.4%.  
Other things equal, women are 1.3 percent more likely to enter college than men. 
Blacks are 1.5% less likely to attend and Hispanics are 2.4% less likely to attend than 
comparable whites. College entry is more probable for urban residents, and for children in 
higher-income and more educated families. 
     C. The gender gap in schooling 
Recently, boys have been less likely to continue on to college after their high school 
graduation than girls.23 In our sample, 71% of female high school graduates entered college 
compared to 62% of their male counterparts.24 In our sample, boys work more than girls 
while in high school. Can differential work histories explain some of the gender gap in 
college entry? To examine this question, we replicate our estimation procedure separately for 
boys and girls. The results are shown in Table 6. 
Teenage work while in high school negatively affects college entry decisions for both 
boys and girls, but the effects are significantly different between the sexes. The marginal 
effect shows that a 10% increase in hours worked during high school lowers college entry by 
1.7% for girls and by about 1.1% for boys. Consequently, the lower rate of college entry for 
boys is not caused by spending more time working.  
                                                 
22 The elasticity is computed by multiplying the marginal effect by a reciprocal of the average college entry 
probability which is 0.66. 
23 Women currently make up 57% of all college students. 
24 See Appendix 3 for summary statistics of high school graduates by gender. 
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 D. Sensitivity analysis 
 A number of additional analyses were run to test the sensitivity of these results to the 
specification of the work intensity variables. In one set, we replaced cumulative hours of 
work during the school year with cumulative hours of work in the summer. Table 7 and 
Table 8 show the estimates of different sets of employment intensity measures on high school 
GPA and college entry respectively. For comparison purposes, we add the previous estimates 
obtained using cumulative hours worked during high school year. Results adding in work 
during the summer months did not alter conclusions, presumably because those who worked 
most in the school year also worked most in the summers.25 Instrumented summer work 
hours had a negative but insignificant effect on GPA, and they reduced the probability of 
going to college by the same magnitude as when school year work hours were used. 
 We also used annual measures of school-year work rather than cumulative work 
hours across four years. In all cases, predicted work hours in the freshman, sophomore, junior 
and senior years failed to affect high school GPA. Annual school-year hours worked 
significantly lowers the probability of attending college in all four years with the largest 
negative effect from work hours during the freshman year. A 10% increase in employment 
intensity during 9th grade lower the probability of attending college by 2.6%. However, the 
coefficients in other years are only modestly smaller in magnitude. 
 Our college entry results were conditioned on having graduated from high school. 
There is a possibility that the possible selection problems due to dropouts are clouding our 
estimates of the impact of hours worked on college entry. To examine this, we estimated a 
                                                 
25 Nearly 77% of freshmen who worked during the school year worked in the following summer. This 
percentage rises steadily with school- year grade: 80% of sophomores; 83% of juniors; 87% of seniors. (Source: 
Author's computations based on the sampled NLSY97) 
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multinomial logit model that measures the impact of school-year work during the first two 
years of high school on three choices, dropout, ending schooling after completing high 
school graduation, or entering college. In Table 9, we report the marginal effect of each 
independent variable on the probability of changing students’ status relative to dropping out 
of school. Increasing instrumented cumulative hours of work in high school raises the 
likelihood of high school graduation but lowers the probability of attending college.26 This 
seems to mimic the mixed message found in earlier studies regarding the impact of school-
year work on academic performance. Child labor seems to be marginally good for high 
school graduation but marginally harmful for college entry.27 
3.6. Conclusion 
Although the teenage labor force participation rate has been declining in the United 
States, the majority of high school students work during the school year at some point in the 
four years of high school. Past studies have found mixed results regarding the impact of 
working in high school on academic outcomes. This study takes into account the endogeneity 
of the school-year labor supply decision and of the possibility of increasing damage from 
more intense work hours in assessing the impact on success in school. We show that the 
intensity of school-year work varies directly with the strength of the local retail sector and 
with the expected age at high school entry and inversely with the strength of state child labor 
and truancy regulations. We also found significant differences in work hours depending on 
the month of birth, presumably because the month of birth alters the probability of entering 
                                                 
26 Similar results are obtained when we replicate this analysis separately by gender. (see Appendix 4)  
27 All the instruments pass standard overidentification tests. Probability of dropout is uncorrelated with all of 
the instruments except expected age of high school entry. Our results are the same whether we include or 
exclude expected age of high school entry.  
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high school at a younger age. Our results show that more intense work while in school does 
not affect high school academic performance and it actually has a small positive effect on the 
probability of completing high school. However, a ten percent increase in hours of work 
leading to a 1.4% reduction in the probability of attending college. Often working while in 
high school is defended as a means of earning money that could be used for further schooling, 
but on average, the income earned on school-year work might be destined for other purposes.  
Several states have attempted to limit child labor beyond the federal limits. We found 
that those state restrictions do have a significant effect on the amount of time children in 
those states spend working during high school. As to the effectiveness of those laws in 
influencing human capital investments, it appears that they do raise the likelihood of going to 
college but they do not affect high school academic performance.  
References  
Angrist, Joshua D. and Alan B. Krueger. 1991. “Does Compulsory School Attendance Affect 
Schooling and Earnings?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (November): 979–1014. 
 
Black, Dan A.,Terra G. Mckinnish, and  Sanders,Seth. 2005. “Tight Labor Markets and the 
Demand for Education: Evidence from the Coal Boom and Bust.” Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review 59 (October): 3-16. 
 
Bound, John, David A. Jaeger and Regina M. Baker. 1995. “Problems with Instrumental 
Variables Estimation When the Correlation between the Instruments and the Endogenous 
Explanatory Variable is Weak.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 90 (June): 
443-450. 
 
Cameron, Stephen V., Christopher Taber,. 2004. “Estimation of Educational Borrowing 
Constraints Using Returns to Schooling.” Journal of Political Economy 112 (February): 132-
182. 
  
D’Amico, Ronald. 1984. “Does Employment during High School Impair Academic 
Progress?” Sociology of Education 3 (July): 152-164. 
 
  
60 
 
Eckstein, Zvi, and Kenneth I. Wolpin.1998. “Youth Employment and Academic Performance 
in High School.” Center for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper no. 1861. London: 
Center for Economic Policy Research. 
 
Greenberger, Ellen and  Laurence D. Steinberg. 1986. “ When Teenagers Work: The 
Psychological and Social Costs of Adolescent Employment: New York, NY: Basic Books. 
  
Hannah, Richard L. 2001. “An Examination of College-Bound High School Students’ Labor 
Market Behavior: Why Some Students Work and Why Some Do Not.” Unpublished 
manuscript. 
 
Lillydahl, Jane H. 1990. “Academic Achievement and Part-Time Employment of High 
School Students.” Journal of Economic Education 21 (Summer): 307-316. 
 
Mortimer, Jeylan T., Michael J. Shanahan and Kathleen T. Call. 1996. “The effects of Work 
Intensity on Adolescent Mental Health, Achievement, and Behavioral Adjustment: New 
Evidence from a Prospective Study.” Child Development 67 (Jun.): 1243-1261.  
 
National Center for School Engagement. 2003. “Compulsory Attendance Laws Listed by 
State.”:www.truancyprevention.org. 
 
National Research Council and Institute of Medicine, Committee on the Health and Safety 
Implications of Child Labor. 1998. “Protecting youth at work: Health, safety, and 
development of working children and adolescents in the United States.” Washington, D.C.: 
www.nap.edu/catalog/6019.html. 
 
Oettinger, Gerals S. 1999. “Does High School Employment Affect High School Academic 
Performance?” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 53 (October): 136-151. 
 
Rothstein, Donna S. 2001. “Youth Employment in the United States.” Monthly Labor Review 
124 (August): 6-17. 
 
Rothstein, Donna S. 2007. “High School Employment and Youths’ Academic Achievement” 
Journal of Human Resources 42 (Winter): 194-213. 
 
Ruhm, Christopher J. 1997. “Is High School Employment Consumption or Investment?” 
Journal of Labor Economics 15 (October): 735-776. 
 
Singh, Kusum. 1998. “Part-Time Employment in High School and its Effect on Academic 
Achievement.” The Journal of Educational Research 91 (January/February): 131-139. 
 
Staiger, Douglas, and James H. Stock. 1997. “Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak 
Instruments.” Econometrica 65 (May): 557-586. 
 
  
61 
 
Steinberg, Laurence D., Ellen Greenberger, and Laurie Garduque. 1982. “Effects of Working 
on Adolescent Development.” Development Psychology 18 (May): 383-395. 
  
Stinebrickner, Ralph, Todd R. Stinebrickner. 2003. “Working during School and Academic 
Performance.” Journal of Labor Economics 21 (April): 473-491. 
 
Tienda, Marta and  Avner Ahituv.1996. “Ethnic Differences in School Departure: Does 
Youth Employment Promote or Undermine Educational Attainment?” Pp. 93-110 in Of 
Heart and Mind: Social Policy Essays in Honor of Sar A.Levitan, Michigan: Upjohn Institute 
Press, edited by Garth Magnum and Stephen Magnum. 
 
Tyler, John H. 2003. “Using State Child Labor Laws to Identify the Effect of School-to-
Work on High School Achievement.” Journal of Labor Economics 21 (April): 381-408. 
 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.2003. Employment Experience of Youths during the School 
Year and Summer. January 31. press release USDL 03-40. 
 
Warren, John R., Paul Lepore, Robert D. Mare. 2000. “Employment during High School: 
Consequences for Students’ Grades in Academic Courses.” American Educational Research 
Journal 37 (Winter): 943-969.  
 
 
 
 
  
  
62 
 
 Figure 1. Distribution of students who entered high school by age 14 and birth month 
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 Table 1. Distribution of states and observations across legal dropout age 
 
Age 
allowed 
to leave 
Number 
of states 
affected 
Stated affected 
Number of 
observations 
affected 
 
Age16 
 
26 
 
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New 
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode 
Island, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia 
 
 
2037 
Age17 5 Arkansas, Mississippi, Pennsylvania,  
South Carolina, Tennessee  
  
423 
Age18 12 California, District of Columbia, Indiana, 
Louisiana, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Texas, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin
  
1537 
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 Table 2. Summary statistics 
 
  
HS Dropouts 
(1) 
Terminating 
HS graduates 
(2) 
 
College attending 
(3) 
Least HS 
graduate 
(2) + (3) 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Dependent         
HS GPA 2.12 0.80 2.70 0.67 3.13 0.66 2.99 0.70 
College NA NA NA NA 1 0 0.66 0.47 
Work HS NA NA 1429 1157 1172 947 1259 1029 
Work Fr/Sop 657 707 554 608 442 544 480 569 
Work Jun/Sen NA NA 1187 855 985 726 1053 778 
Work Summer 
 in Freshman 
391 296 331 258 294 248 306 252 
Independent         
Male 0.55 0.49 0.53 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.46 0.49 
Black 0.29 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.22 0.41 0.23 0.42 
Hispanic 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.41 0.15 0.36 0.18 0.38 
Urban 0.76 0.42 0.67 0.46 0.71 0.44 0.70 0.45 
HH income 30,307 26,279 43,464 30,374 66,356 51,837 58,717 47,056 
Broken family 0.67 0.46 0.48 0.5 0.35 0.47 0.39 0.48 
Father’s education 11.2 2.9 12.0 3.0 13.9 3.1 13.3 3.2 
Mother’s education 11.3 2.8 11.9 2.7 13.4 2.8 13.0 2.9 
Instrument         
Birth month 6.1 3.3 6.1 3.4 6.3 3.4 6.2 3.4 
Expected age  
at grade 9  
14.2 0.7 14.0 0.55 14.0 0.4 14.0 0.4 
Legal dropout age 16.8 0.9 16.9 0.9 16.8 0.9 16.9 0.9 
Local earnings 10,033 2,530 10,243 2,210 10,118 2,233 10,160 2,226 
         
N 607 1128 2252 3380 
Weighted fraction 15.2% 28.2% 56.4% 84.6% 
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 Table 3. OLS regressions for hours of work during the school year and high school GPA  
 including control variables and instruments 
 
 Regression 
         ln ( Cumulative hours of work) HS GPA 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Instrument      
Birth month 
 
-.140** 
(.056) 
-.134** 
(.056) 
-.131** 
(.056) 
.004 
(.014) 
Birth month square 
 
.012*** 
(.004) 
.011*** 
(.004) 
.011*** 
(.004) 
-.001 
(.001) 
Expected age at grade 9 
 
.507*** 
(.097) 
.508*** 
(.097) 
.490*** 
(.097) 
-.021 
(.026) 
Legal dropout age 
  
-.117** 
(.050) 
-.151*** 
(.051) 
.010 
(.013) 
ln (local earnings /1,000) 
   
.766*** 
(.205) 
.069 
(.051) 
Control       
Male .092 
(.089)  
.065 
(.089) 
.068 
(.089) 
.081 
(.089) 
-.256*** 
(.023) 
Black -.979*** 
 (.126) 
-.941*** 
(.119) 
-.943*** 
(.119) 
-.913*** 
(.125) 
-.251*** 
(.030) 
Hispanic -1.080*** 
 (.139) 
-1.055*** 
(.130) 
-.993*** 
(.133) 
-.956*** 
(.141) 
-.182*** 
(.035) 
Live in urban area .062 
(.099) 
.083 
(.101) 
.094 
(.101) 
.150 
(.101) 
-.026 
(.027) 
ln (family income) .180*** 
(.051) 
.189*** 
(.044) 
.191*** 
(.043) 
.187*** 
(.052) 
.026** 
(.011) 
Father’s education -.004 
(.010) 
-.003 
(.010) 
-.004 
(.010) 
-.005 
(.010) 
.010*** 
(.003) 
Mother’s education -.027** 
(.012) 
-.024** 
(.012) 
-.027** 
(.012) 
-.027** 
(.012) 
.012*** 
(.003) 
Broken family .305** 
(.123) 
.306* 
(.128) 
.303** 
(.128) 
.290** 
(.122) 
-.043 
(.034) 
Intercept 4.324*** 
(.549) 
-2.662* 
(1.460) 
-.728 
(1.678) 
-1.685 
(1.744) 
2.687*** 
(.442) 
      
R2 .042 .050 .052 .056 .109 
N  3380 3380 3380 3380 3380 
Test of H0 ------ F = 9.90 F = 8.79 F = 9.85 F = 0.81 
Instruments are jointly zero ------ P = .000 P = .000 P = .000 P = .541 
Partial R2 ------ .0100 .0143 .0213 ------ 
 Note. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
           *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level.                             
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 Table 4. OLS and IV estimates of cumulative hours of work and other control variables on 
 high school GPA  
 
 Regression 
 OLS IV1 IV2 IV3 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln (Hours of work) 
 
.017** 
(.004) 
-.039 
(.047) 
-.050 
(.044) 
-.010 
(.037) 
Male -.255** 
(.022)  
-.254*** 
(.023) 
-.253*** 
(.023) 
-.257*** 
(.023) 
Black -.269** 
 (.030) 
-.290*** 
(.056) 
-.302*** 
(.053) 
-.263*** 
(.047) 
Hispanic -.195** 
 (.033) 
-.219*** 
(.061) 
-.232*** 
(.058) 
-.189*** 
(.053) 
Live in urban area -.028 
(.025) 
-.027 
(.026) 
-.026 
(.026) 
-.029 
(.026) 
ln (family income) .029* 
(.011) 
.033** 
(.014) 
.036*** 
(.014) 
.028** 
(.013) 
Father’s education .009** 
(.002) 
.010*** 
(.003) 
.010*** 
(.003) 
.010*** 
(.003) 
Mother’s education .011** 
(.002) 
.011*** 
(.003) 
.011** 
(.003) 
.012*** 
(.003) 
Broken family -.036 
(.032) 
-.030 
(.036) 
-.027 
(.036) 
-.039 
(.036) 
Intercept 2.788** 
(.122) 
2.882** 
(.238) 
2.931** 
(.225)  
2.760** 
(.198) 
     
Instrument for birth month 
 
NA 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Instrument for birth month square 
 
NA 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Instrument for expected age at grade 9 
 
NA 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Instrument for legal dropout age 
 
NA 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Instrument for local earnings NA No No Yes 
     
Overidentification test:     
Basmann test ( Chi-sq) ------ .475 .839 3.806 
P-value(Degrees of Freedom) ------ .789(2) .840(3) .433(4) 
R2 .111 .106 .097 .111 
N  3380 3380 3380 3380 
 Note. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.  
           *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level.                             
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 Table 5. Probit and Two-stage probit estimates of cumulative hours of work and other 
 control variables on college entry 
 
  Regression   
 Probit            Two-Stage  Probit 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln (Hours of work) 
 
-.011*** 
(.003) 
 [-.017] 
-.099*** 
(.021) 
 [-.149] 
-.088*** 
(.023) 
 [-.132] 
-.089*** 
(.019) 
 [-.134] 
Male -.110*** 
(.017)  
-.082*** 
(.020) 
-.088*** 
(.020) 
-.088*** 
(.019) 
Black -.018   
 (.022) 
-.104*** 
(.029) 
-.094** 
(.031) 
-.095*** 
(.029) 
Hispanic -.067*** 
 (.025) 
-.155*** 
(.029) 
-.146*** 
(.032) 
-.147*** 
(.029) 
Live in urban area .073*** 
(.019) 
.065*** 
(.019) 
.068*** 
(.019) 
.068*** 
(.019) 
ln (family income) .032*** 
(.009) 
.042*** 
(.008) 
.042*** 
(.007) 
.042*** 
(.007) 
Father’s education .006*** 
(.002) 
.005** 
(.002) 
.005*** 
(.002) 
.005** 
(.002) 
Mother’s education  .017*** 
(.002) 
.011*** 
(.003) 
.013*** 
(.003) 
.012*** 
(.003) 
Broken family -.057** 
(.024) 
-.019 
(.026) 
-.025 
(.026) 
-.025 
(.025) 
     
Instrument for birth month 
 
NA 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Instrument for birth month square 
 
NA 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Instrument for expected age at grade 9 
 
NA 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Instrument for legal dropout age 
 
NA 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Instrument for local earnings NA No No Yes 
     
Overidentification test:     
Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum Chi-sq ------ 1.667 5.779 5.734 
P-value(Degrees of Freedom) ------ .435(2) .123(3) .220(4) 
Pseudo R2 .071 .071 .070 .071 
N  3380 3380 3380 3380 
 Note. 1. Marginal probabilities are reported rather than probit coefficients. 
           2. Standard errors from Maximum likelihood estimates (ivprobit in Stata 9) are reported in parentheses.  
           3. Numbers in brackets are the elasticity.  
               *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level.                             
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 Table 6. Probit and Two-stage probit estimates of cumulative hours of work and other 
 control variables on college entry by gender 
 
  Regression   
 Probit             Two-Stage  Probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Girls     
ln (Hours of work) 
 
-.009** 
(.004) 
 [-.017] 
-.119*** 
(.022) 
 [-.179] 
-.107*** 
(.026) 
 [-.161] 
-.107*** 
(.023) 
 [-.161] 
Overidentification Test:     
Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum Chi-sq ------ .900 4.662 4.586 
P-value(Degrees of Freedom) ------ .638(2) .198(3) .333(4) 
Pseudo R2 .057 .060 .058 .059 
N  1799 1799 1799 1799 
Boys     
ln (Hours of work) 
 
-.015*** 
(.005) 
[.024] 
-.074** 
(.035) 
[.111] 
-.068* 
(.036) 
[.102] 
-.068** 
(.030) 
[.102] 
Overidentification test:     
Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum Chi-sq ------ .393 1.228 1.222 
P-value(Degrees of Freedom) ------ .822(2) .746(3) .874(4) 
Pseudo R2 .071 .073 .072 .073 
N  1581 1581 1581 1581 
 Note. 1. Two stage probit estimates in column (2), (3) and (4) use different set of instruments following  
               previous procedure.  
           2. Marginal probabilities are reported rather than probit coefficients. 
               Standard errors from Maximum likelihood estimates (ivprobit in Stata 9) are reported in parentheses. 
           3. Numbers in brackets are the elasticity.  
           4. All regressions included the other control variables used in Table 5. 
               *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. 
 
 
                
 
 
  
69 
 
 Table 7. IV estimates of cumulative hours of work during summer or during each school- 
 year grade on high school GPA  
 
 Regression 
 OLS IV1 IV2 IV3 
ln (Hours of work) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
                  A.    during high school 
 
.017** 
(.004) 
-.039 
(.047) 
-.050 
(.044) 
-.010 
(.037) 
                  B.    during summer 
 
-.003 
(.005)  
-.029 
 (.042) 
-.040 
(.038) 
-.031 
(.038) 
                  C.    during 9th grade -.007 
 (.006) 
-.037 
(.061) 
-.044 
(.061) 
-.049 
(.061) 
                  D.    during 10th grade -.004 
(.004) 
-.019 
(.029) 
-.023 
(.028) 
-.013 
(.027) 
                  E.    during 11th grade .009 
(.004) 
-.030 
(.047) 
-.043 
(.040) 
-.012 
(.035) 
                  F.    during 12th grade -.016 
(.004) 
-.056 
(.062) 
-.067 
(.052) 
-.016 
(.042) 
     
Instrument for birth month 
 
NA 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Instrument for birth month square 
 
NA 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Instrument for expected age at grade 9 
 
NA 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Instrument for legal dropout age 
 
NA 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Instrument for local earnings NA No No Yes 
     
N  3380 3380 3380 3380 
 Note. 1. All regressions included the other control variables used in Table 4. 
           2. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
               *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. 
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 Table 8. Probit and Two-stage probit estimates of cumulative hours of work during summer 
 or during each school-year grade on college entry 
 
  Regression   
 Probit            Two-Stage  Probit 
ln (Hours of work) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
                  A.    during high school 
 
-.011*** 
(.003) 
-.099*** 
(.026) 
-.088*** 
(.031) 
-.089*** 
(.026) 
                  B.    during summer 
 
-.002 
(.003) 
-.112*** 
(.023) 
-.085*** 
(.029) 
-.095*** 
(.027) 
                  C.    during 9th grade -.004 
(.003)  
-.173*** 
(.028) 
-.172*** 
(.028) 
-.181*** 
(.026) 
                  D.    during 10th grade -.007**   
 (.003) 
-.075*** 
(.020) 
-.073** 
(.021) 
-.078*** 
(.019) 
                  E.    during 11th grade -.003 
 (.003) 
-.111*** 
(.018) 
-.101*** 
(.023) 
-.101*** 
(.019) 
                  F.     during 12th grade -.010*** 
(.003) 
-.124 *** 
(.019) 
-.114 *** 
(.026) 
-.108*** 
(.022) 
     
Instrument for birth month 
 
NA 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Instrument for birth month square 
 
NA 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Instrument for expected age at grade 9 
 
NA 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Instrument for legal dropout age 
 
NA 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Instrument for local earnings NA No No Yes 
     
N  3380 3380 3380 3380 
 Note. 1. Marginal probabilities are reported rather than probit coefficients. 
           2. All regressions included the other control variables used in Table 5.           
           3. Standard errors from Maximum likelihood estimates (ivprobit in Stata9) are reported in parentheses. 
           4. All regressions except regressions using summer hours worked pass overidentification test. 
           5. Numbers in brackets are the elasticity. 
               *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. 
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 Table 9. Multinomial logit model of dropouts, high school graduation, and college attending 
 
 High school graduation 
Variable Coefficients P-value Marginal 
Effects 
P-Value 
Log predicted work hour -.361 <.001 .032 .041 
Male .013 .910 .065 <.001 
Black -.021 .902 .047 .078 
Hispanic -.083 .637 .081 .005 
Urban -.419 .001 -.066 <.001 
Log household income .204 <.001 -.033 <.001 
Father Education .028 .014 -.004 .025 
Mother Education .030 .013 -.011 <.001 
Broken Family -.454 .003 .022 .307 
Constant -.473 .316   
 College attending 
Variable Coefficients P-value Marginal 
Effects 
P-Value 
Log predicted work hour -.624 <.001 -.090 <.001 
Male -.361 .002 -.090 <.001 
Black -.298 .071 -.070 .018 
Hispanic -.569 .001 -.126 <.001 
Urban -.132 .266 .042 .031 
Log household income .439 <.001 .072 <.001 
Father’s education .056 <.001 .009 <.001 
Mother’s education .103 <.001 .020 <.001 
Broken family -.685 <.001 -.090 <.001 
Constant -2.524 <.001   
     
Log Likelihood -3486    
N 3987    
Pseudo R2 .095    
 Note. Dropouts is used as a reference. 
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 Appendix 1.a. IV estimates of cumulative hours of work on high school GPA by different 
 definition of birth month 
 
 Regression 
 OLS IV1 IV2 IV3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. ( 1=January,…..,12=December) .017** 
(.004) 
-.039 
(.047) 
-.050 
(.044) 
-.010 
(.037) 
B. (1=September,……,12=August) .017** 
(.004) 
-.013 
(.048) 
-.030 
(.043) 
.004 
(.036) 
C. 11 birth month dummies .017** 
(.004) 
-.039 
(.043) 
-.048 
(.039) 
-.014 
(.034) 
 Note. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Column (2), (3) and (4) use different set of 
           instruments. *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. 
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 Appendix 1.b. Probit and Two-stage probit estimates of cumulative hours of work and other 
control variables on college entry 
 
  Regression   
 Probit            Two-Stage  Probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. ( 1=January,…..,12=December) -.011*** 
(.003) 
-.099*** 
(.021) 
-.088*** 
(.023) 
-.089*** 
(.019) 
B. (1=September,……,12=August) -.011*** 
(.003) 
-.099*** 
(.021) 
-.099*** 
(.022) 
-.089*** 
(.019) 
C. 11 birth month dummies -.011*** 
(.003) 
-.114*** 
(.016) 
-.107*** 
(.018) 
-.103*** 
(.016) 
 Note. 1. Marginal probabilities are reported rather than probit coefficients. 
           2. Standard errors from Maximum likelihood estimates (ivprobit in Stata 9) are reported in parentheses.  
               *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level.                             
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 Appendix 2. OLS and IV estimates of cumulative hours of work and other control variables  
 on high school GPA by gender 
 
  Regression   
 OLS IV1 IV2 IV3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Girls     
ln (Hours of work) -.010* 
(.006) 
-.068 
(.075) 
-.069 
(.064) 
-.025 
(.055) 
Overidentification Test     
Basmann Test ( Chi-sq) ------ .128 .128 2.182 
P-value(Degrees of Freedom) ------ .938(2) .988(3) .702(4) 
R2 .086 .039 .037 .083 
N  1799 1799 1799 1799 
Boys     
ln (Hours of work) -.015*** 
(.005) 
-.015 
(.059) 
-.024 
(.057) 
.005 
(.048) 
Overidentification test ------- .47 .79 .63 
Basmann test ( Chi-sq) ------ .445 .812 1.602 
P-value(Degrees of Freedom) ------ .800(2) .847(3) .808(4) 
R2 .095 .093 .095 .082 
N  1581 1581 1581 1581 
 Note. 1. IV estimates in column (2), (3) and (4) use different set of instruments following previous procedure.  
           2. All regressions included the other control variables used in Table 4. 
           3. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
               *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. 
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 Appendix 3. Summary statistics by gender 
 
 
 
Female high school graduates 
(n=1799) 
Male high school graduates  
(n=1581) 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
Dependent     
HS GPA 3.10 .69 2.87 .70 
College .71 .45 .62 .49 
Work HS 1175 924 1354 1130 
Work Fr/Sop 405 459 552 649 
Work Jun/Sen 1020 731 1091 827 
Work Summer 
 in Freshman 
277 219 336 279 
Independent     
Black .26 .44 .21 .41 
Hispanic .18 .38 .18 .39 
Urban .71 .45 .70 .46 
HH income($) 56,906 47,198 60,777 46,825 
Broken family .42 .49 .37 .48 
Father’s education 13.3 3.2 13.4 3.2 
Mother’s education 13.0 3.0 13.0 2.8 
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 Appendix 4. Multinomial logit model of dropouts, high school graduation, and college  
 attending by gender 
 
Girls     
  High school graduation  
Variable Coefficients P-value Marginal 
Effects 
P-Value 
Log predicted work hour -.200 .170 .055 .007 
     
  College attending  
Variable Coefficients P-value Marginal 
Effects 
P-Value 
Log predicted work hour -.558 .140 -.095 <.001 
     
Log Likelihood -1710    
N 2967    
Pseudo R2 .090    
Boys     
  High school graduation  
Variable Coefficients P-value Marginal 
Effects 
P-Value 
Log predicted work hour -.507 <.001 .006 <.001 
  College attending  
Variable Coefficients P-value Marginal 
Effects 
P-Value 
Log predicted work hour -.691 <.001 -.085 <.001 
     
Log Likelihood -1761    
N 1920    
Pseudo R2 .096    
 Note. Dropouts is used as a reference. 
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Chapter 4. Lifetime Health Consequences of Child Labor in Brazil 
 
Abstract 
Health consequences of child labor may take time to manifest themselves. This study 
examines whether adults who worked as children experience increased incidence of illness or 
physical disability. The analysis corrects for the likely endogeneity of child labor and years 
of schooling using variation in number of schools per children, number of teachers per 
children and low skill wages at the time the adults were children. Results show that the 
effects of child labor on adult health are complex. When child labor and schooling are treated 
as exogenous variables, child labor appears to increase the likelihood of poor health 
outcomes in adulthood. However, when they are considered endogenous, child labor loses 
power to explain adverse adult health outcomes. The effect remains marginally significant 
for only a few adult health measures. This finding is consistent with other evidence that child 
laborers select lifetime occupations with higher incidences of ailments and physical 
disabilities. 
4.1. Introduction 
The International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 182 calls for the prohibition 
and elimination of the worst forms of child labor. In addition to universally condemned 
occupations such as child slavery, prostitution, pornography and drug trafficking, the worst 
forms include work that is likely to jeopardize the health, safety or morals of young persons 
(ILO, 1999). The ILO estimates that there are 111 million children aged 5 to 14 involved in 
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hazardous work.28 This number is equivalent to 53% of working children and about 9% of all 
children in the world. Children engaged in such activities are presumed to face immediate 
health threats by the nature of the work. However, child labor could also have health 
consequences that only become manifest in adulthood. Such long-term health risks can 
develop from early exposure to dust; toxins; chemicals such as fertilizer and pesticides; 
inclement weather; heavy lifting; or the forced adoption of poor posture. Hazards may also 
threaten psychological health through exposure to abusive relationships with employers, 
supervisors or clients (ILO, 1998). 
The linkage between working as a child and health status later as an adult has not 
been widely explored. This study aims to fill that knowledge gap by examining whether 
adults who entered the labor market early in life suffer higher rates of chronic diseases and 
functional limitations in adulthood. We address the question using the 1998 Pesquisa 
Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios (PNAD) which included a series of questions on health 
and disability status. It also included questions on whether current adults worked as children. 
Estimating the causal effect of early entry into labor market on adult health is 
complicated by the selection process which sorts children into the labor market. On the one 
hand, we might expect that only reasonably healthy children would be sent to work at young 
ages as sickly children would not be capable of work. On the other hand, children from the 
poorest households are the most likely to work, and growing up in poverty may be correlated 
with adverse health outcomes.29  Thus, the early incidence of child labor may be correlated 
                                                 
28 All children aged 5-14 are considered by the ILO to be engaged in hazardous work if they are working in 
mining or construction or in occupations or processes considered hazardous by their nature or if they work more 
than 43 hours per week.  
29  Case et al. (2002) and, Currie and Stabile (2003) present evidence that children in poorer families have 
significantly worse health than children in richer families. 
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with unobservable positive or negative health endowments that could affect adult health in 
addition to any direct impact of child labor on health. These unobserved health endowments 
cloud the interpretation of simple correlations between child labor and adult health outcomes.  
Another confounding factor is that child labor may affect a child’s years of schooling 
completed, and education has been shown to positively affect adult health.30  The effect of 
child labor on education in Brazil is uncertain. Because the average school day lasts only four 
hours, many children in Brazil both work and attend school. Child labor may help the 
household afford more years of schooling. On the other hand, child labor may retard child 
cognitive attainment per year of schooling, and it may also lead to earlier exit from school 
into full time work.31  A complete assessment of the effect of child labor on health must 
consider the indirect effect of child labor on schooling.  
In this study, adult health is measured by the incidence of chronic diseases and by 
functional limitations in performing activities. We estimate the relationship of these adult 
health outcomes to child labor first by assuming that age of labor market entry and years of 
schooling completed are exogenous. We then use variation in the supply and quality of local 
schools and low skill wages in the state the adult was born at the time the adult was a child as 
instruments for endogenous age of labor market entry and years of schooling completed. 
These variables affected the relative value and cost of child time in school versus work and 
of household ability to support child time in school and so they should have influenced labor 
                                                 
30  Studies have consistently found a large positive correlation between education and health (Van Doorslaer 
(1987), Wagstaff (1993), Grossman, Michael and R. Kaestner (1997), Lleras-Muney (2005)).  
31 Evidence of the impact of child labor on schooling attainment is mixed with some studies finding negative 
effects (Psacharopoplous, 1997) while others (Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997), Ravallion and Wodon 
(2000)) finding that schooling and work are compatible. There is stronger evidence that child labor lowers test 
scores, presumably because it makes time in school less efficient (Post and Pong (2000), Heady (2003), Rosatti 
and Rossi (2003), Gunnarrson et al (2006)). 
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supply and schooling decisions during childhood. However, these factors should have no 
direct impact on the child’s health a quarter century later in adulthood.  
The results are complex. When treated as exogenous, child labor is positively 
correlated with a higher incidence of adult chronic diseases and functional limitations. 
However, when they are considered endogenous, child labor loses power to explain adverse 
adult health outcomes. The effect remains marginally significant for only a few adult health 
measures. We  still find that there is a significant combined effect of child labor and 
schooling on the incidence of chronic health conditions later in life.  
The next section summarizes the literature on child labor and long-term health. In 
section 4.3, we describe our model and estimation strategy. Section 4.4 provides data and 
descriptive statistics. In section 4.5, we present empirical results. In section 4.6, we 
summarize our findings and their implications for policy and further research. 
4.2. Literature Review 
 
Until recently, most studies linking child labor and health have focused on the health 
of currently working children. The comprehensive review by Graitcer and Lerer (1998) 
presented a mixed picture of international evidence regarding the impact of child labor on 
health, primarily because of data limitations. Data on the extent of child labor itself is subject 
to considerable error, but data on the incidence of child injuries on the job are even more 
problematic. Sources of information come from government surveillance, sometimes 
supplemented by data from worker’s compensation or occupational health and safety 
incidence reports. These latter sources are less likely to be present in the informal labor 
markets in which child labor is most common, and government surveillance is often weak. 
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Nevertheless, reported injury rates are not small: of working children aged 10-14, 9% are 
estimated to suffer injuries annually, and 3.4% are estimated to suffer disabling injuries.  
Information on longer term health consequences of child labor such as occupational 
diseases or repetitive motion injuries is even more limited and subject to errors. In a rare 
example of longitudinal data applied to the question, Satyanarayana et al (1986) examined 
anthropometric data on 410 children over a 17 year period in a rural area in India. They 
found that children who worked in agriculture, small-scale industry and services had worse 
growth in height and weight when followed through to adulthood than those who attended 
school. They did not consider the issue of nonrandom selection into work or industry. 
Two larger-scale studies using different Brazilian data sets provide some evidence on 
the negative long term effect of child labor on adult health. Kassouf et al (2001) found that 
the probability of self-reported poor health increases as the age of labor market entry 
decreases. However, this result should be interpreted with caution in that child labor and 
schooling are treated as exogenous and no other control variables are used. Giuffrida et al 
(2005) found that starting to work under age 9 has a negative and significant effect on adult 
health. Their estimates control for age, race, education, wealth, housing conditions, and 
unemployment status. However, if child labor alters wealth, housing status or unemployment 
later in life, some of these controls are jointly determined with child labor and adult health, 
again raising concerns about endogenous child labor.  
Rosati and Straub (2004) used a sample of Guatemalan siblings which controlled for 
unobservable household attributes in assessing the impact of child labor on adult health. 
However their strategy still treats child labor and possible resulting decisions regarding 
schooling and income as exogenous. In addition, their sample is restricted to adults who are 
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still living with their parents, and so their sample is heavily weighted toward relatively young 
adults. Moreover, if the decision to live with parents is conditioned on health outcomes, as 
would be the case if healthy children are more likely to live on their own and children 
suffering illness or disability are more likely to remain with their parents, then their sample 
will be biased toward finding adults with health problems. Selection might explain why they 
find such large adverse health consequences:  having worked as a child increased by 40% the 
probability of having health problems as an adult. Nevertheless, their finding of very large 
health consequences from child labor illustrates the importance of further examination of the 
link between child labor and adult health. 
There does appear to be a prima facie case that starting to work early in life can lead 
to the early onset of physical disabilities and chronic illness in adulthood. Figure 1 shows the 
relationship between age of labor market entry and various health conditions for several birth 
cohorts in Brazil. Adults who started working earliest as children have a higher incidence of 
back problems and arthritis than do their contemporaries who entered the labor market at 
older ages. Older cohorts have a higher incidence of these problems than younger cohorts, 
but the downward pattern between health problems and age of labor market entry is found in 
all cohorts. Interestingly, there is no apparent pattern between the incidence of hypertension 
and age of labor market entry. Presumably, the incidence of hypertension would be tied more 
closely to heredity and life style and less to years of work. 
The downward pattern between age of labor market entry and adult adverse health 
outcomes are found for self reported problems walking, bending, lifting, pushing, climbing 
stairs, and kidney disease (see Appendix 1). Other than the last measure, these health 
problems appear to be physical and potentially associated with repeated physical stress. 
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Patterns similar to the hypertension case are found for self-reported cancer, diabetes, asthma, 
heart disease, depression, tuberculosis, cirrhosis, and tendonitis. Other than the last indicator, 
these health conditions tend to reflect heredity and life style choices. The balance of the 
paper examines whether we can identify the nature of the link between child labor and adult 
health.  
4.3. Model and Estimation Strategy 
 
      A. Conceptual model: A household model of child labor and schooling and adult 
            health 
 Suppose that households have a single parent and a single child. The parent works 
full time, earning income Y. The child’s time normalized to unity is divided between leisure 
( 1L ); child labor ( 1C ); and schooling ( 1S ); so that 1 1 11 L C S= + + . The superscript refers to the 
childhood period. If the child works, they are paid an exogenous wage, 1W . If they attend 
school, they access exogenous school inputs, 1Z .  
 The parent gets utility from the child’s future wealth, ( 2 0
W
U > ) where future wealth 
has the form 2 2 1 1 1 2( , , , , , )W W C S Z a h H= . Wealth depends on the allocation of child time in the 
first period to school and to work; on the child’s fixed endowments of ability (a) and health 
(h);  and on the future health of the child, 
2 2 1 1( , , , )H H C S a h= . The child’s future health also 
depends on how the child’s time is allocated between school and work and on the ability and 
health endowments. Parents also derive utility from child leisure ( 1 0
L
U > ) and from 
consumption of goods, X , so that 0XU > . 
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 The parents choose current consumption, child labor, and child time in school so as to 
maximize utility 1 1 2 1 1 1 2[ , (1 ), ( , , , , , )]U X C S W C S Z a h H− −  subject to the budget constraint 
1 1Y W C PX+ =  where P is the price of consumer goods purchased by the parent.  
 Assuming interior solutions, the first order conditions imply that  
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
1
1 2 1 1 2 1
( ) ( )X
W W
U W W H W W H
W U U
P C H C S H S
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
+ + = +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ .
    (1) 
 The left-hand-side of the equality is the marginal utility the parents derive from child 
labor. Child labor increases household income and so consumption rises, but child labor also 
affects the future wealth of the child through skill development (
2
1
W
C
∂
∂
) and through the 
child’s lifetime health (
2
1
H
C
∂
∂
). Parents will discount the utility they get from consumption 
derived from child labor if at the same time they compromise the child’s lifetime health (i.e. 
2
1
0
H
C
∂
<
∂
) and health contributes to the child’s future wealth.  
 The right-hand-side of the equality is the marginal utility from allocating child time to 
school. Schooling can affect child’s future wealth through its impact on skill development 
and on lifetime health.  
 The reduced form equations for child time allocation to work and school will depend 
on all the exogenous variables 1W , 1Z , a, h, Y, and P. These reduced form equations will 
prove useful in identifying child labor and time in school as we explore there impacts on 
adult health outcomes implied by the health production equation
2 2 1 1( , , , )H H C S a h= . 
      B. Estimation strategy 
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We use our stylized household model to identify the variables entering the reduced 
form child labor and schooling equations. The linear approximations to these equations for 
child i born in state j as a member of age cohort t are of the form 
1 1 1 'C C C C C C C
ijt Z jt W jt Y jt ijt D j t ijtC Z W Y Dϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ δ δ ε= + + + + + +      (2) 
1 1 1 'S S S S S S S
ijt Z jt W jt Y jt ijt D j t ijtS Z W Y Dϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ δ δ ε= + + + + + +  .       (3) 
The vector ijtD  is composed of exogenous demographic attributes that only include time 
invariant race or gender or clearly exogenous age. We do not include occupation, 
employment status, marital status and the presence of children or other choices that would be 
conceivably correlated with health or ability endowments. To the extent that these variables 
are choices conditioned on schooling or child labor choices earlier in life, they would be 
endogenous to adult health outcomes and must therefore be excluded from the empirical 
model. 
 The dummy variables kjδ  and 
k
tδ control for differences in prices across cohorts and 
across birth states, but they will also help to control for differences in the mix of jobs 
children undertake across birth states and across time.  
 The error terms contains unobserved ability and health endowments which theory 
suggests ought to enter the reduced from equations, so that  
 ; , .k k k kijt a ijt h ijt ijta h k C Sε α α ξ= + + =         (4) 
The last term kijtξ is an iid random error. The reduced from equations (2) and (3) demonstrate 
that parental choices on age of labor market entry and child time in school will depend on 
parental observations of the child’s endowments of ability and health. If, for example, the 
parameters in (4), kaα and 
k
hα are positive, then children who are born with better health and 
ability will both work more and attend school more in period 1.  
In period 2, these endowments of health and ability will carry over to observations of 
adult health. Let the equation explaining adult health be given by  
2 ' 1 1 H H H
ijt ijt D C ijt S ijt j t ijtH D C Sβ β β δ δ ε= + + + + +    (5) 
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where as before, the error term has the form .H H H Hijt a ijt h ijt ijta hε α α ξ= + +  Because adult health is 
conditioned on unobserved health and ability endowments, 1( , ) 0Hijt ijtCOV Cε ≠ and 
1( , ) 0Hijt ijtCOV Sε ≠ . Ordinary least squares applied to equation (5) will yield biased estimates of 
Cβ  and Sβ . To continue our hypothetical example, if the parameters 
H
aα and
H
hα are also 
positive, Cβ  and Sβ will overstate the impact of child labor and years of schooling on 
observed health. If the true value of Cβ  <0, then the coefficient on child labor will be biased 
against finding an adverse effect of child labor on adult health.  
           Our point is not to predict the direction of bias, but simply to indicate that unobserved 
health and ability endowments in childhood will carry over to cloud our interpretation of the 
consequences of decisions made in childhood on adult health. However, if our assumption 
that adult health is not directly influenced by the period 1 school attributes 1jtZ , child 
wages 1W , or household incomes Y, then we have a battery of instruments with which to 
identify the true effect of child labor and years of schooling on adult health. Inserting the 
expected values of 1ijtC  and 
1
ijtS into (5), we obtain 
          
2 ' 1 1 ' 1 1
'
( ) (
)
C C C C C C S S
ijt ijt D C Z jt W jt Y jt ijt D j t S Z jt W jt
S S S S H
Y jt ijt D j t ijt
H D Z W Y D Z W
Y D
β β ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ δ δ β ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ δ δ υ
= + + + + + + + + +
+ + + +
   (6) 
The hypothesized exclusion restrictions generate variation in child labor and years of 
schooling that is uncorrelated with the unobserved ability and health endowments, and so we 
can derive unbiased estimates of Cβ  and Sβ . Our strategy is to estimate equations (2), (3), 
and (6) jointly in order to derive efficient estimates of the coefficients of interest.32  Because 
equations (2) and (3) have interest in and of themselves, insomuch as they show how the 
economic and school environment affects decisions on years of schooling and child labor, we 
also report those estimates as well. Finally, to provide a frame of reference for the estimates 
in (6), we estimate (5) directly to illustrate the nature of the biases.  
                                                 
32 Emerson and Souza (2006) employed a similar approach to identify causal relationships between child labor 
and adult earnings. 
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      C. Instruments 
  We observe health outcomes in period 2 when the individual is an adult, but 
decisions on child labor and schooling occur in period 1 when the individual is a child. Both 
child labor and years of schooling are period 1’s household decisions that reflect 
unobservable characteristics of the individual’s family. To properly control for the potential 
endogeneity of child work activity and years of education in the adult health production 
function, we need instruments that would affect age of entry into the labor market and years 
of schooling completed but would not directly affect health during adulthood. We do not 
have information on family background measures for adults during period 1 when they were 
children, and so we need to look to other sources of information for factors that should affect 
these schooling and labor market choices. 
 One set of variables that may satisfy the conditions reflect the availability and quality 
of schools in the area where the adult grew up.33  The presence of more schools per child 
residing in the state lowers the average travel costs of attending schooling in the state. 
Similarly the number of teachers per child can be used as a proxy for school quality in the 
state. Since age 7 is the age of school entry in Brazil, we use the number of schools per child 
and the number of teachers per child at age 7 in the state in which the individual was born as 
our measures of period 1 school availability and school quality.  
Other factors that have been commonly used to explain variation in schooling 
investments and child labor include household income and the opportunity cost of 
                                                 
33  Bedi and Edwards (2002), Gertler and Glewwe (1990), Duflo (2001, 2004), Glick and Sahn (2006), and 
Alderman et al (2001) all found evidence that schooling decisions are influenced by distance and/or school 
quality. 
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schooling.34  We measure the strength of labor demand by the relative wage for workers with 
four or fewer years of schooling as an indicator of the value of time for illiterate labor in 
period 1.35  Because relatively few children work and those that do rarely work for wages, 
information on average pay for children is extremely limited and subject to selection 
problems. However, this will also be related more generally to shifting demand for adult 
labor in the state, as average years of schooling for parents at the start of the period would 
have been around four years. Rising low-skill wages will increase the income potential of the 
parents as well as the children. We date the measure at the time the adult was 12 years old in 
the state of birth, the youngest age at which a child could legally work in Brazil.  
We do not have information on local prices, and so we include dummy variables for 
state of birth and age cohort to help control for price variation across states and across time. 
These dummy variables are not treated as instruments, and so we also include them in the 
second-stage health regressions. 
As we will see, these instruments have strong predictive power for both the age of 
labor market entry and for years of schooling completed. In addition, they have signs that are 
consistent with the presumed roles of these variables in shaping the attractiveness of schools, 
and the opportunity cost of child time on the endogenous variables. However, they do not 
have direct predictive power for adult health, and so they meet the empirical criteria for valid 
instruments. 
4.4. Data and Descriptive Analysis 
      A. Data  
                                                 
34 Card (1995) and Cameron and Taber (2004) used local labor market conditions as opportunity cost of 
schooling. Rosenzweig (1980) used agricultural day wages in India. 
35 It is commonly presumed that on average, it takes about five years of schooling to attain permanent literacy. 
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 The main source of data used for the analyses is 1998 Pesquisa Nacional Por Amostra 
de Domicilios (PNAD), the Brazilian equivalent of the Current Population Survey in the 
United States. The PNAD98 collected information from 112,434 households and 344,975 
individuals and included information on labor force participation and earnings in conjunction 
with standard demographic characteristics such as age, gender, race, schooling, state of birth 
and state of residence. Periodically the PNAD survey contains extra questions on such topics 
as marriage, health, migration, nutrition and social mobility. The 1998 edition of the PNAD 
uniquely fits our needs. It included information on the age the respondent first entered the 
labor market. It also included a special health module which included questions eliciting the 
respondent’s self reported health status. Questions related to twelve specifics chronic 
diseases or conditions (back problems, arthritis, cancer, diabetes, asthma, hypertension, heart 
disease, kidney disease, depression, tuberculosis, tendonitis, and cirrhosis) and to seven 
physical disabilities (difficulty feeding and bathing, raising objects, going upstairs, bending 
down, carrying and pushing, walking 1 kilometer, and walking 100 meters).  
 The remaining sources of data are related to construction of the instruments described 
in the previous section. Data on the number of primary schools, the number of teachers, and 
the population by state and year are taken from the IBGE Historical Series 2003.36 Data on 
the average low skilled wage rate for each year and state were computed from data in the 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) International.37 Average income measures 
                                                 
36 We are grateful to Patrick Emerson and Andre Souza for providing us the historical data on schools and 
teachers by state. 
37 IPUMS International provides census data on wages every ten years. To interpolate state-specific average 
wage rates for low-skilled between census years, we use state-specific temporal variation in per capita income. 
We presume that there are larger changes in wages in years with larger annual increases in average income. 
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are computed from data from the IPEA historical series.38 Their summary statistics are 
included in Table 1. 
 The sample was selected to include only household heads or their spouses aged 30-55. 
We exclude older people because we wish to concentrate on the early onset of health 
complications. As individuals age, all health complications become more common, and so 
the potential impact of early labor market entry becomes more difficult to isolate. 
Furthermore, required information on the wages for low-skilled workers was unavailable for 
the older birth cohorts. We exclude younger workers to concentrate only on those who have 
completed their potential years of schooling. Additionally, we restrict the sample to those 
who first entered the labor market at or before age 30. To allow for differential health 
outcomes by gender related to fertility and to possible occupational differences between men 
and women, we constructed two sub-samples: adult women aged 30-55, adult men aged 30-
55. The total number of cases in the two sub-samples, after deletion of cases with missing 
data on the variables used, was 28,043 adult women and 39,884 adult men.  
      B. Descriptive analysis 
 Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the variables used in the study. Average age 
of labor market entry is 13.3 years. Male adults entered the labor market 1.4 year earlier. The 
average years of schooling is 6.8 years with women receiving 0.5 years more schooling than 
men. Men constitute around 60 percent of sample.39 54 percent of the sample is White, 39.2 
percent Brown (or mixed), 6.1 percent Black.  
                                                 
38 IPEA is the research institute of the Ministry of Planning of the Brazilian Federal Government. These series 
can be obtained on line at http://www.ipeadata.gov/ipeaweb.dll/ipeadata?1026025750.  
39 In the initial sample, men and women are equally represented, but women were less likely to report age of 
labor market entry. 
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 Self-reported adverse health status ranged from almost 30 percent for back problems 
to less than 1 percent for cancer, tuberculosis, cirrhosis and inability to walk 100 meters. 
Other than kidney disease, responses differed significantly between men and women. In most 
cases, women have higher rates of chronic ailments. There are also seven questions related to 
the individual’s ability to accomplish tasks.40  The highest incidence of physical limitation 
was the 9% reporting difficulty lifting heavy things. Women also report having more task-
related disabilities. 
In our sample, there are 25 states and 26 birth years from 1943 to 1968.41  Thus, the 
maximum possible number of different values for each instrument is 650. To illustrate the 
range of values, we selected Piaui and Sao Paulo, the poorest and the richest states in Brazil. 
We also report statistics for Santa Catrina whose GDP per capita is the closest to the country 
average. Figures 2.a to 2.d show real income per adult, the number of schools per 1000 
children, the number of teachers per 1000 children and the average wage rate of people with 
less than 5 years of schooling. In Figure 2.a, we can see the ‘Brazilian economic miracle’ 
years during the 1970s when GDP per capita almost doubled. The average number of schools 
per 1000 children increased from 4 to 6.5 for 25 years. While the number of schools per 
thousand children in Piaui increased by a factor of 4 from the 1950s to 1975, changes in other 
states were more modest. The ratio of teachers to students rose steadily in Brazilian states 
except in the early 1970s. Average wages of low-skilled people remained relatively stable 
                                                 
40 For chronic conditions, responses were absence or presence of the condition. For disabilities, respondents 
evaluated their degree of disability as “unable to perform tasks”; “great difficulty performing tasks”;  “little 
difficulty performing tasks”;  or “no difficulty performing tasks”. We treat the first two responses as indicating 
disability.  
41  Brazil has 27 states currently. Following the classification in Appendix E of Emerson and Souza (2006), we 
collapsed the states of Goias and Tocantines, and the states of Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul. Tocantins 
and Mato Grosso do Sul were created recently from a division of the old Goias and old Mato Grosso, 
respectively. Some territories were transformed into states and some states were merged along the 20th century. 
See Appendix E of Emerson and Souza (2006) for detail information.  
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from the mid 1950s to the late 1960s. As the economy boomed in 1970s, the gaps of low-
skilled wage rates across states widened soaring in Sao Paulo and steadily rising in Piaui. The 
patterns show sizeable variations in the instruments across states at a point in time and across 
cohorts within states.  
Figures 3 and 4 show the distributions of the age individuals first entered the labor 
market, and of their educational attainment. The most common age of labor market entry is 
10, but there is substantial variation across individuals. About one-third of children enter the 
labor market before the legal working age. A larger percentage of boys than girls started 
working under age 15. The years of schooling attained are similarly broadly dispersed. 
Figure 5 shows that the birth cohort average age of labor market entry increased by only 1.7 
years from 11.8 years for those born in 1943 to 13.5 years for those born in 1968. Over the 
same period, years of schooling increased 2.8 years from 4 years to 6.8 years. 
Table 2 breaks the sample into age groups: 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49 and 50-55. 
This stratification allows us to explore the age-gradient of excess occurrences of chronic 
diseases by age of labor market entry. We concentrate on the three most common of the 12 
diseases for which we have information, back problems, arthritis, and hypertension. Among 
women aged 30 to 34, approximately 36 percent of those starting work when under 10 had 
back pain. For those who began working after age 14, only 20% reported back problems. The 
incidence of back pain increases with cohort age. These patterns are similar for males, 
although fewer males report back problems even when age of labor market entry is held fixed.  
Both males and females who started working before age 10 are significantly more 
likely to have arthritis. The same pattern is reported for early onset of the incidence of 
hypertension, although for men, differences in the incidence of hypertension by labor market 
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entry disappear after age 45. The average incidence rates for the rest of diseases by age group 
are reported in Appendix 2. Overall, the descriptive analysis suggests that starting to work at 
an early age is correlated with earlier onset of some but not all adverse health problems in 
adulthood. Most common problems correlated with early labor market entry are physical 
ailments. In the next section, we examine if this pattern remains after controlling for other 
factors and for nonrandom sorting into school and work. 
4.5. Empirical Results 
      A. Child labor and morbidity treating child labor and education as exogenous 
 We first examine the sets of health indicators that were considered chronic diseases or 
disabilities. We will repeat these exercises later using health indicators that measure physical 
disabilities. 
 Table 3 reports the marginal effects of a probit specification of equation (5), taking 
into account demographic factors such as age cohort, gender, race and state of birth. These 
specifications ignore the endogeneity problems. Early onset of child labor increases the 
probability of having spinal disorders. An adult who started to work one year earlier is 0.7% 
more likely to report back problems holding other factors fixed. The incidence of spinal 
disorders decreases by about 1% for each additional year of schooling, controlling for child 
labor. The other coefficients show that incidence of self-reported spinal disorders increase 
with age, are larger for women than men, and are larger for minority groups.  
 Similar results are obtained for the impact of child labor on adult incidence of arthritis 
and hypertension. Delaying labor market entry by one year lowers the probability of having 
arthritis by 0.4% and reduces hypertension by 0.2% after controlling for educational 
attainment. Larger positive effects on adult health are found from an additional year of 
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schooling. Completing one more year of school lowers the incidence of arthritis by 0.7% and 
of hypertension by 0.3%. 
 Table 4 presents the related estimation for other chronic diseases. Even after 
controlling for educational attainment, child labor increases significantly the incidence of 
asthma, heart and kidney disease, depression and tendonitis.  
 Our results indicate that when child labor is treated as exogenous, child labor 
consistently is associated with adverse health consequences. Early entry into the labor market 
increases the probability of having more physical-related chronic diseases (i.e., back 
problems and arthritis), but they seem to be related to other health problems that would be 
less obviously tied to child labor. Of course, the correlation may be due to the unobserved 
ability and health endowments and not to a true causal relationship. 
      B. Child labor and morbidity considering child labor and education as endogenous 
 Our labor supply and schooling educations (2 and 3) are used to identify child labor 
and schooling in equation (6). We first demonstrate that our instruments can significantly 
explain variation in the age at which children first start working and the years of schooling 
completed. We regress age of labor market entry and years of schooling completed on state-
level number of schools per thousand children, number of teachers per thousand children, 
and the wage for less-educated workers that prevailed at the time the adult was a child. The 
regression also includes time invariant demographic attributes and controls for cohort and 
state of birth. 
  Table 5 presents the first-stage regression results. Better access to schools delay labor 
market entry. Individuals born in states with more schools and more teachers per child enter 
the labor market at older ages. Stronger demand for low-skill labor, as indicated by higher 
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wages for workers with less than five years of schooling, induces children to enter the labor 
market later in life. We do not have separate information on wages for children and adults, 
and so rising wages for low skilled labor may be increasing demand for labor generally. 
Rising labor demand can raise family income sufficiently that child labor is no longer needed, 
as was found by Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005b, 2006) in Vietnam.42 The null hypothesis that 
the coefficients on these three variables are jointly equal to zero was easily rejected, as seen 
by the F- statistic reported at the bottom of the Table.43   
 The second column of Table 5 shows the first stage regression for years of schooling 
completed. Individuals born in states with easier access to grade schools and with more 
teachers per child in the population completed more years of schooling. Higher state average 
low skill wages were also associated with completing more years of schooling although it is 
not statistically significant. This may mean that older family members specializing in work 
earn sufficient amounts to help subsidize their siblings’ schooling, or it may reflect the 
frequent practice of combining school and work for Brazilian children. The null hypothesis 
that the three coefficients are jointly equal to zero was again easily rejected. 
 Table 6 presents the results of estimating equation (6) jointly with equations (2) and 
(3). The estimated effects of early entry into labor force and years of schooling on the 
incidence of selected chronic disease are shown in the first two rows in each column.44 The 
                                                 
42 Emerson and Souza (2006) found that the number of schools per children and number of teachers per school 
is positively associated with age of labor market entry and that GDP per capita is negatively associated with age 
of labor market entry in Brazil. Cameron and Taber (2004) found individuals with a college in their county 
complete more year of schooling and local earnings at age 17 is not associated with schooling at significant 
level.  
43 Clustering by state of birth is applied. There is a possibility that individuals live in a state different from their 
birth state when instruments are applied; at their age 7 or 12. However, Fiess and Verner (2003) showed that 
less than 1% of Brazilian migrated to other states before their age about 10. Thus, using information of state of 
birth as instruments may not be a problematic.  
44 Related estimations for other diseases are reported in Appendix 3. 
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IV probit estimates of child labor effects on health are higher than the probit estimates in 
Table 3. Treating labor market entry as endogenous implies a one year delay decreases back 
problems by 23% and hypertension by 42%. There is also 11% increase in the incidence of 
arthritis with entering labor market by one year earlier but it is not statistically significant. 
However, the association between education and the incidence of these ailments are not 
maintained at significant level. The effect of schooling on adult health conditions becomes 
negligible when the endogeneity of child labor and education are considered. In fact, holding 
age of labor market entry constant, the coefficient on years of schooling turns positive but not 
significantly different from zero.  
Nevertheless, there is a joint effect of child labor and schooling on adult back 
problems. Evaluated at sample means, entering the labor market one year earlier while 
reducing years of schooling by one year increases the incidence of back problems by 15%, 
other things constant. Similar joint effects are found for other chronic conditions reported in 
Table 6.  
 We conclude that the hypothesis that adverse health consequences follow directly 
from early entry into the labor market are partially supported by the data. In addition, we find 
evidence that there is a significant joint effect of child labor and schooling on the incidence 
of chronic health conditions later in life. 
Women are more likely to suffer these ailments than men. Generally, minorities are 
less likely to report chronic diseases than are otherwise observationally equivalent Whites. 
There are no significant cohort effects on the incidence of disease or disability after 
correcting for the endogeneity of age of labor market entry and years of schooling. 
      C. Child labor and disability 
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We complete our analysis of the long-term impact of child labor on health by 
examining the connection between child labor and measures of physical limitations. The 
objective is to corroborate the morbidity evidence with results for other health indicators. As 
explained in section IV, the functional disability question provides important information on 
the long-term health of individuals. The same approach used for chronic diseases is applied 
to examine the effect of early entry into labor market on the probability of having functional 
limitations. We examine the effects of child labor and schooling on the probability of having 
health problems that impede an individual from performing activities such as raising objects, 
climbing stairs or walking 1 kilometer.45 Treating child labor and schooling as exogenous, 
results in Table 7 show that delaying labor market entry by one year consistently lowers the 
probability of adverse health outcomes by small but statistically significant magnitudes after 
controlling for years of schooling. Compared to the results in Table 4, the implied adverse 
effects of child labor on health are larger for physical ailments than for chronic ailments with 
the exception of hypertension, kidney disease and depression for which impacts are of 
comparable size. 
When child labor and schooling are treated as endogenous, as reported in Table 8, the 
harmful effects of early entry into the labor market and lower years of schooling on 
functional disability disappear.46 The joint effect of child labor and schooling on adult health 
is found only in difficulty climbing stairs. In general, instrumented age of labor market entry 
and years of schooling have a little effect on the probability of having an onset of physical 
disability at a young age. 
                                                 
45 The remaining estimates of the other functional disabilities are reported in Appendix 4.a. 
46 Appendix 4.b includes the IV estimates for other functional limitations: pushing and carrying; bending down; 
walking 100m. They show a similar pattern like other work-limiting disabilities. 
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      D. Child labor and adult health by occupation 
It might be arguable that adverse adult health conditions come from occupational 
choice rather than age at start of work. People working in more physically demanding jobs 
would have more physical injuries by the nature of work. However, it is likely that child 
labor may reduce schooling, and in turn, limit occupational choice which does result in 
increased incidences of chronic condition in adulthood. Some of our results indicate that 
there is an adverse effect of child labor on adult health after controlling for education. To 
explore whether our results are sensitive to the current occupation individuals have, we 
divide our adult workers into age cohorts, and then within cohorts, we divide them into 
occupations. Then, we check for significant differences in adult health outcomes for 
members of the same cohort in the same occupation who differ only by age of labor market 
entry. We use a probit model to capture the average probability of an adverse health outcome 
for individuals who started to work before age 12 and those who started to work at ages 12 
through 14, using those who entered the labor market after age 14 as the comparison group. 
Results are reported in Table 9.47 
The reported marginal effects of early labor market entry for those in agriculture, 
manufacturing and service jobs control for age, gender, race and state of birth. All workers 
are between ages 37 to 43.48  Entering the labor market earlier increases the incidence of 
back injury. Regardless of current occupation type, we find a higher incidence of spinal 
problems for people who started working before age 12, which is the youngest legal working 
                                                 
47 We replicate this analysis for people with 4 through 7 years of schooling regardless of their current 
occupation type assuming that years of schooling is related to occupational choice. Similar results are reported 
in Appendix 5.a. 
48 We checked for different outcomes for other cohorts that might occur due to changes in the occupational 
distribution across age cohorts. Similar results are obtained.  
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age in Brazil, and the marginal effect is larger than for those who delayed work until ages 12-
14. Similar results are obtained for the adverse effect of child labor on arthritis except that 
the estimates are not significant for agricultural occupations. There is no apparent significant 
pattern for hypertension. Same exercise is repeated for selected work-limitations as shown in 
Table 10.49 The only difference is that starting work at age 12 through 14 does not increase 
the probability of having difficulty in selected functional limitations compared to starting 
work later. 
Overall, the results indicate that early entry into labor market has adversely effect on 
adult health condition in marginal level beyond limitations on occupational choices to 
occupations with greater risk of physical disabilities through reduced schooling from child 
labor.  
      E. Child labor and adult health by gender 
 Another examination of the linkage between child labor and adult health is related to 
gender differences. Because girls and boys may perform different tasks, the effect of child 
labor on adult health might be different between males and females. As shown above, 
females have a higher incidence of adverse health outcomes than males. Replicating our 
estimation procedure separately for males and females, we test whether estimated 
coefficients of age of labor market entry and years of schooling differ across genders. There 
is no apparent differential effect of child labor on adult health between males and females 
except that for women, child labor is associated with greater problems lifting heavy objects, 
climbing stairs, and walking 100m. (See Appendix 6.a and 6.b) 
                                                 
49 We replicate this analysis for people with 4 through 7 years of schooling regardless of their current 
occupation type assuming that years of schooling is related to occupational choice. Similar results are reported 
in Appendix 5.b. 
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4.6. Conclusion 
 This study examines the consequences of child labor on the individual’s self-reported 
health as an adult. It utilizes a unique Brazilian labor market survey that incorporates both 
contemporaneous measures of health status with retrospective data on child labor. The health 
measures include both morbidity and work-limiting disabilities. This study takes into account 
the endogeneity of child labor and years of schooling completed using instrumental variables 
that measure the direct cost and opportunity cost of schooling and the ability to pay for 
schooling implicitly at the time the individual was a child and in the state in which the 
individual was born.  
 Without correcting for endogeneity, the results show that earlier labor market entrants 
suffer consistently from higher incidence of chronic diseases and disabilities after controlling 
for education. Controlling for endogeneity, we find that the adverse health consequences of 
child labor on adult health is marginally significant in several ailments including back 
problems and hypertension. Nevertheless, we still find evidence that there is a significant 
joint effect of child labor and schooling on the incidence of chronic health conditions later in 
life. This finding is consistent with other evidence that child laborers select lifetime 
occupations with higher incidences of ailments and physical disabilities.  
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 Figure 1. Age of labor market entry and self reported adult health conditions in Brazil by age  
 cohort (Source: Authors’ compilation based on data from the 1998 PNAD) 
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 Figure 2.a. Real income (in thousands) per adult by year cohort was age 12:  
                    Brazil and selected states (in 2000 Reals) 
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 Figure 2.b. Number of schools per 1000 children by year cohort was age 7: 
                    Brazil and selected states 
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 Figure 2.c. Number of teachers per 1000 children by year cohort was age 7: 
                    Brazil and selected states 
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 Figure 2.d. Average wage rate (in thousands) of workers with less than 5 years 
                    of schooling by year cohort was age 12: 
                    Brazil and selected states (in 2000 Reals) 
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 Figure 3. Distribution: Age of labor market entry (%) 
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 Figure 4. Distribution: Years of schooling completed (%) 
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 Figure 5. Average years of schooling completed and age of labor market entry  
                 by birth cohort 
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 Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
 
Pooled sample 
(n=66839) 
Female  
(n=31133) 
Male 
(39884) 
Variable 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Age started to work 13.3 4.4 4 30 14.1 4.9 12.7 3.9 
Years of schooling 6.5 4.7 0 17 6.8 4.8 6.3 4.7 
Male .587 .492 0 1         
Age 40.7 7.0 30 55 40.4 6.9 40.9 7.0 
Black .061 .239 0 1 .060 .238 .061 .239 
Brown .392 .488 0 1 .388 .487 .394 .489 
Other race .006 .078 0 1 .006 .079 .006 .077 
age3036 .334 .472 0 1 .344 .475 .328 .469 
age3743 .318 .466 0 1 .326 .469 .312 .463 
Chronic Disease                 
Back problems .296 .456 0 1 .326 .469 .274 .446 
Arthritis .104 .305 0 1 .137 .343 .080 .272 
Cancer .002 .044 0 1 .003 .052 .001 .037 
Diabetes .020 .139 0 1 .022 .147 .018 .133 
Asthma .030 .170 0 1 .037 .189 .024 .155 
Hypertension .150 .357 0 1 .183 .387 .126 .332 
Heart disease .040 .196 0 1 .050 .219 .032 .177 
Kidney disease .042 .200 0 1 .042 .200 .042 .200 
Depression .070 .254 0 1 .111 .314 .040 .197 
Tuberculosis .001 .034 0 1 .001 .029 .001 .037 
Tendonitis .031 .173 0 1 .046 .208 .021 .143 
Cirrhosis .002 .047 0 1 .001 .033 .003 .055 
Functional Limitation                
Raising object .086 .281 0 1 .114 .318 .067 .249 
Pushing and carrying .017 .130 0 1 .026 .160 .011 .104 
Climbing stairs .041 .198 0 1 .062 .241 .026 .158 
Bending down .039 .193 0 1 .053 .224 .029 .167 
Walking 1km .029 .167 0 1 .042 .200 .020 .139 
Walking 100m .004 .063 0 1 .005 .072 .003 .056 
Instruments                
Number of school at age 7 5.5 1.8 1.4 11.9 5.6 1.8 5.5 1.8 
Student -teacher ratio at age 7 20.1 8.5 5.1 51.6 20.3 8.6 20.0 8.5 
Lower-skilled income at age 12 .79 .58 .11 3.18 .80 .58 .79 .58 
GDP per capita at age 12 2.7 2.1 .3 11.8 2.7 2.1 2.7 2.1 
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 Table 2. Average incidence rate of chronic diseases by people starting to work at different 
 ages (%) 
 
 Female Male 
Age \ Age started 
to work 
5-9 10-14 15+ Total 5-9 10-14 15+ Total 
Back problems         
30-34 35.7 25.7 20.4 24.4 26.4 21.3 16.6 20.5 
35-39 35.6 31.7 23.7 28.4 32.8 24.3 19.6 24.4 
40-44 42.5 36.2 27.9 33.6 34.7 28.1 21.5 27.5 
45-49 49.3 40.9 33.9 39.7 40.6 34.0 25.6 33.1 
50-55 53.6 45.2 39.7 45.4 44.1 37.6 27.1 36.7 
Total 43.1 34.7 26.8 32.6 35.7 28.0 21.1 27.4 
Arthritis         
30-34 11.8 8.1 4.3 6.8 6.1 4.2 2.1 3.8 
35-39 15.2 11.2 6.2 9.4 8.7 5.0 3.4 5.2 
40-44 21.4 14.7 8.5 13.1 12.4 7.6 4.2 7.6 
45-49 28.5 21.7 12.7 19.4 14.7 11.1 7.7 10.9 
50-55 37.9 30.8 18.7 28.5 21.7 17.5 9.9 16.7 
Total 22.7 15.7 8.4 13.7 12.7 8.2 4.7 8.0 
Hypertension         
30-34 13.7 9.4 6.5 8.6 6.9 6.2 5.3 6.0 
35-39 16.9 14.2 9.2 12.2 10.3 8.4 7.9 8.6 
40-44 22.8 22.8 16.7 20.1 14.1 13.3 12.7 13.3 
45-49 32.1 28.5 21.2 26.2 16.5 17.9 18.7 17.8 
50-55 40.4 35.1 31.2 35.1 21.7 22.9 22.3 22.4 
Total 24.9 20.2 14.1 18.3 13.9 12.6 11.8 12.6 
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 Table 3. Probit estimates of age started to work, years of schooling and other control  
 variables on the incidence of selected chronic diseases 
 
Variables Back Problems Arthritis Hypertension 
Age started to work -.0067*** -.0040*** -.0019*** 
 (.0005) (.0003) (.0004) 
Years of schooling -.0108*** -.0069*** -.0032*** 
 (.0004) (.0003) (.0003) 
Age3036 -.1181*** -.0809*** -.1339*** 
 (.0040) (.0020) (.0026) 
Age3743 -.0639*** -.0495*** -.0718*** 
 (.0041) (.0020) (.0027) 
Male -.0697*** -.0615*** -.0623*** 
 (.0036) (.0023) (.0028) 
Black -.0217*** -.0054 .0563*** 
 (.0075) (.0024) (.0066) 
Brown .0047 .0057** .0163*** 
 (.0041) (.0025) (.0032) 
Other race -.0214 .0051 .0045*** 
 (.0231) (.0153) (.0178) 
    
Pseudo R2 .0421 .1067 .0567 
N 67927 67901 67927 
Note.1. Marginal probabilities are reported rather than probit coefficients.  
         2. Regression also includes dummy variables for state of birth.  
         3. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
             *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level.
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 Table 4. Partial probit estimates of the health consequences of age started to work and  
 years of schooling  
 
Variables Cancer Diabetes Asthma 
Age started to work <-.0001 -.0001 -.0003* 
 (<.0001) (.0001) (.0002) 
Years of schooling <-.0001 <-.0001 -.0001 
 (<.0001) (.0001) (.0002) 
Pseudo R2 .0413 .0518 .0150 
N 64853 67883 67901 
    
 Heart disease Kidney disease Depression 
Age started to work -.0008*** -.0018*** -.0022*** 
 (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) 
Years of schooling -.0009*** -.0023*** -.0006*** 
 (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) 
Pseudo R2 .0447 .0384 .0503 
N 67857 67927 67867 
    
 Tuberculosis Tendonitis Cirrhosis 
Age started to work <.0001 -.0003** <.0001 
 (<.0001) (.0002) (<.0001) 
Years of schooling <-.0001*** .0012*** -.0001*** 
 (<.0001) (.0001) (<.0001) 
Pseudo R2 .0490 .0421 .0443 
N 64421 67857 66459 
    
Note. 1. Marginal probabilities are reported rather than probit coefficients.  
          2. Regression also includes dummy variables for cohort and state of birth and demographic variables in 
              Table 3.  
          3. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
               *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. 
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 Table 5. IV Estimates-first stage regression 
 
Variables Age started to work Years of schooling 
Age3036 .098 .531*** 
 (.097) (.139) 
Age3743 .224*** .754*** 
 (.071) (.114) 
Male -1.373*** -.502*** 
 (.059) (.063) 
Black -1.013*** -2.637*** 
 (.195) (.239) 
Brown -.0793*** -2.255*** 
 (.065) (.085) 
Other race .287 1.295 
 (.456) (.815) 
Number of school per 1,000 children by state .103*** .153*** 
 (.020) (.027) 
Number of teacher per 1,000 children by state .027*** .030** 
 (.006) (.012) 
Average wage rate for low-skilled worker by state .171** .128 
 (.067) (.133) 
Intercept 15.642*** 7.885*** 
 (.114) (.164) 
   
Test of Excluded Instruments F(4,24) 31.8 19.2 
R-Squared .080 .134 
N 67927 67927 
Note. 1. Regression also includes dummy variables for state of birth. 
          2. Clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.    
              *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. 
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 Table 6. IV Estimates-second stage regression on incidence of selected chronic disease 
 
Variables Back Problems Arthritis Hypertension 
Age started to work -.2347* -.1103 -.4242* 
 (1.75) (1.33) (1.89) 
Years of schooling .0862 .0045 .2317 
 (.78) (.19) (1.29) 
Age3036 -.0648 -.0249 -.1101 
 (1.50) (1.14) (1.63) 
Age3743 -.0502 -.0114 -.1029 
 (.94) (.28) (1.27) 
Male -.3378** -.2415*** -.6050** 
 (2.55) (2.73) (2.36) 
Black -.0016 -.0610 .3567 
 (.02) (1.32) (.95) 
Brown -.0236 -.0787** .0948 
 (.25) (1.79) (.52) 
Other race -.0763 .0248 -.1095 
 (.72) (.62) (.96) 
    
Pseudo R2 .0270 .0783 .0561 
N 67927 67901 67927 
Test: Joint effects of child labor 
         and schooling are zero  
Chi2(1)=10.12 Chi2(1)=4.77 Chi2(1)=29.76 
Overidentification test Chi2(1)=3.06 Chi2(1)=.28 Chi2(1)=.21 
Note. 1. Marginal probabilities are reported rather than probit coefficients.  
          2. Regression also includes dummy variables for state of birth. 
          3. |Z| statistics from the initial estimation using New’s minimum chi square estimators are reported in 
              parentheses.  
          4. The Amemiya-Lee-Newey test results for overidentification of instruments were generated using 
              Baum, Schaffer, Stillman and Wiggins’(2006) overid.ado program for Stata.9.  
          5. The overidentification test and joint test is distributed chi2(1) with a critical value of 3.84 at the .10 
              significance level. 
              *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. 
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 Table 7. Probit estimates of age started to work and other control variables on the 
 probability of having difficulty performing activity 
 
Variables Raising Object Climbing stairs Walking 1km 
Age started to work -.0030*** -.0014*** -.0011*** 
 (.0003) (.0002) (.0002) 
Years of schooling -.0043*** -.0021*** -.0015*** 
 (.0003) (.0002) (.0001) 
Age3036 -.0660*** -.0321*** -.0209*** 
 (.0020) (.0013) (.0011) 
Age3743 -.0400*** -.0183*** -.0125*** 
 (.0020) (.0012) (.0010) 
Male -.0523*** -.0361*** -.0222*** 
 (.0022) (.0015) (.0013) 
Black -.0085** .0005 -.0017 
 (.0041) (.0028) (.0022) 
Brown .0063*** .0044*** .0049*** 
 (.0024) (.0015) (.0013) 
Other race -.0178 -.0103 -.0154** 
 (.0118) (.0068) (.0043) 
    
Pseudo R2 .0707 .0857 .0654 
N 67901 67901 67741 
Note.1. Marginal probabilities are reported rather than probit coefficients.  
         2. Regression also includes dummy variables for state of birth.  
         3. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
             *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. 
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 Table 8. IV Estimates-second stage regression on the probability of having difficulty  
 performing activity 
 
Variables Raising object Climbing stairs Walking 1km 
Age started to work -.0609 -.0750 -.0172 
 (1.10) (1.57) (.62) 
Years of schooling -.0127 .0298 -.0079 
 (.32) (.78) (.37) 
Age3036 -.0177 -.0202 -.0034 
 (1.15) (1.56) (.55) 
Age3743 -.0035 -.0161 .0017 
 (.20) (.98) (.09) 
Male -.1568** -.1869*** -.0587* 
 (2.52) (2.57) (1.73) 
Black -.0602 .0106 -.0208 
 (1.49) (.19) (1.15) 
Brown -.0705* -.0035 -.0250 
 (1.81) (.07) (1.28) 
Other race .0089 -.0210 -.0091 
 (.18) (.83) (.51) 
    
Pseudo R2 .0553 .0705 .0521 
N 67901 67901 67741 
Test: Joint effects of child labor 
         and schooling are zero 
Chi2(1)=2.77 Chi2(1)=10.89 Chi2(1)=1.97 
Overidentification test Chi2(1)=.86 Chi2(1)=.05 Chi2(1)=.08 
Note. 1. Marginal probabilities are reported rather than probit coefficients.  
          2. Regression also includes dummy variables for state of birth. 
          3. |Z| statistics from the initial estimation using New’s minimum chi square estimators are reported in 
               parentheses.  
          4. The Amemiya-Lee-Newey test results for overidentification of instruments were generated using 
              Baum, Schaffer, Stillman and Wiggins’(2006) overid.ado program for Stata.9.  
          5. The overidentification test and joint test is distributed chi2(1) with a critical value of 3.84 at the .10 
              significance level. 
              *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. 
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 Table 9. Estimates of child labor effect on incidence of selected chronic disease by   
 occupation 
 
Occupation \ Diseases Spine Arthritis Hypertension 
Age started to work    
Agriculture    
    Age started to work <12 .092*** .027 .029 
 (.030) (.022) (.020) 
    Age started to work 12-14 .071** -.021 .020 
 (.035) (.024) (.024) 
    
    Pseudo R2 .015 .034 .042 
    N 3088 3078 3088 
Manufacturing    
    Age started to work <12 .089*** .044*** .012 
 (.018) (.011) (.013) 
    Age started to work 12-14 .043** .011 .004 
 (.019) (.011) (.013) 
    
    Pseudo R2 .022 .066 .022 
    N 4242 4237 4212 
Service    
    Age started to work <12 .068*** .082*** .018 
 (.024) (.018) (.020) 
    Age started to work 12-14 .044* .054*** .035* 
 (.025) (.019) (.021) 
    
    Pseudo R2 .018 .053 .031 
    N 2459 2453 2453 
Note. 1. Regression also includes dummy variables for state of birth and demographic variables. 
          2. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
              *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. 
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 Table 10. Estimates of child labor effect on the probability of having difficulty performing   
 activity by occupation 
 
Occupation \ Limitation Raising object Climbing stairs Walking 1km 
Age started to work    
Agriculture    
    Age started to work <12 .037** .015 .018* 
 (.018) (.012) (.009) 
    Age started to work 12-14 .012 .006 .011 
 (.022) (.015) (.013) 
    
    Pseudo R2 .041 .061 .071 
    N 3088 3040 2926 
Manufacturing    
    Age started to work <12 .028*** .014*** .011** 
 (.010) (.006) (.006) 
    Age started to work 12-14 .005 .004 .001 
 (.010) (.006) (.005) 
    
    Pseudo R2 .058 .078 .094 
    N 4208 4182 4008 
Service    
    Age started to work <12 .024 .037*** .024** 
 (.016) (.013) (.011) 
    Age started to work 12-14 .033** .020 .011 
 (.017) (.014) (.011) 
    
    Pseudo R2 .028 .034 .043 
    N 2433 2431 2328 
Note. 1. Regression also includes dummy variables for state of birth and demographic variables. 
          2. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
              *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. 
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 Appendix 1. Age of labor market entry and self reported adult health conditions in Brazil by 
 age cohort (Source: Authors’ compilation based on data from the 1998 PNAD) 
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 Appendix 1. (continued) 
 
Incidence of heart disease by the age of labor market entry
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Incidence of kidney disease by the age of labor market entry
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Incidence of depression by the age of labor market entry
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 Appendix 1. (continued) 
 
Incidence of tuberculosis by the age of labor market entry
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Incidence of tendonitis by the age of labor market entry
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Incidence of cirrhosis by the age of labor market entry
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 Appendix 1. (continued) 
 
The incidence of having problems raising objects 
by the age of labor market entry
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        The incidence of having problems pushing and carrying
 by the age of labor market entry
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        The incidence of having problems climbing stairs
by the age of labor market entry
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 Appendix 1. (continued) 
 
        The incidence of having problems bending down 
by the age of labor market entry
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        The incidence of having problems walking 1km 
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 Appendix 2. Average incidence rate of chronic diseases by people starting to work at 
 different age (%) 
 
 Female Male 
Age \ Age started 
to work 
5-9 10-14 15+ Total 5-9 10-14 15+ Total 
Cancer         
30-34 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
35-39 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 
40-44 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 
45-49 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 
50-55 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 
Total 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Diabetes         
30-34 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5 
35-39 1.3 1.4 1.0 1.2 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.8 
40-44 3.4 2.0 2.4 2.4 1.8 1.8 2.5 2.0 
45-49 4.0 4.4 2.8 3.7 3.1 2.4 3.4 2.9 
50-55 4.8 5.7 5.4 5.4 3.5 3.6 4.6 3.8 
Total 2.8 2.4 1.8 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.9 1.8 
Asthma         
30-34 5.3 3.9 3.5 3.9 2.0 2.1 2.9 2.4 
35-39 3.8 3.1 3.7 3.5 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 
40-44 4.2 3.8 2.8 3.4 2.9 1.8 2.1 2.1 
45-49 5.2 3.4 4.1 4.0 2.6 2.3 2.5 2.4 
50-55 4.9 3.5 3.5 3.9 3.7 3.1 2.3 3.0 
Total 4.6 3.6 3.5 3.7 2.7 2.3 2.5 2.4 
Heart Disease         
30-34 3.8 2.4 1.8 2.3 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.5 
35-39 5.0 3.5 2.8 3.3 2.6 1.6 2.2 2.1 
40-44 6.7 6.0 3.9 5.2 3.2 2.9 3.4 2.1 
45-49 7.6 8.0 6.4 7.3 4.5 4.0 5.0 4.6 
50-55 13.8 10.4 8.4 10.5 6.2 6.2 6.8 6.5 
Total 7.3 5.5 3.8 5.0 3.6 2.8 3.4 3.3 
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 Appendix 2. (continued) 
 
 Female Male 
Age \ Age started 
to work 
5-9 10-14 15+ Total 5-9 10-14 15+ Total 
Kidney disease         
30-34 7.2 3.9 2.3 3.5 4.3 3.6 2.4 3.3 
35-39 7.6 4.1 2.7 3.9 5.3 4.1 2.1 3.6 
40-44 7.1 5.5 2.4 4.4 5.5 4.6 2.8 4.2 
45-49 4.7 4.7 2.5 3.8 6.2 5.3 3.5 5.0 
50-55 9.1 6.4 3.0 5.9 6.3 6.3 3.1 5.5 
Total 7.2 4.8 2.5 4.2 5.5 4.6 2.7 4.2 
Depression         
30-34 14.2 9.4 7.2 9.4 4.0 3.4 2.6 3.4 
35-39 16.9 10.2 7.7 10.2 4.8 3.5 2.9 3.5 
40-44 15.7 12.5 10.4 12.5 5.4 4.2 3.1 4.2 
45-49 16.9 12.1 10.2 12.1 4.8 5.6 4.3 5.6 
50-55 18.5 13.8 11.2 13.8 5.9 4.9 3.8 4.9 
Total 16.4 11.3 8.9 11.3 5.0 4.2 3.2 4.2 
Tuberculosis         
30-34 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 
35-39 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 
40-44 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
45-49 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
50-55 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 
Total 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Tendonitis         
30-34 3.0 3.4 3.4 3.4 1.2 1.6 1.8 1.6 
35-39 3.9 3.4 4.4 3.9 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.8 
40-44 4.4 5.0 5.3 5.0 2.6 1.7 2.5 2.1 
45-49 5.4 5.3 5.8 5.5 2.2 2.3 2.8 2.4 
50-55 7.2 5.6 5.6 6.0 3.4 2.6 2.7 2.8 
Total 4.7 4.4 4.6 4.6 2.2 1.9 2.2 2.1 
Cirrhosis         
30-34 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 
35-39 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.3 
40-44 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 
45-49 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 
50-55 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.5 
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 Appendix 3. IV Estimates-second stage regression on incidence of chronic disease 
 
Variables  Cancer Diabetes Asthma 
Age started to work -.0148 -.1121* .0435 
 (1.15) (1.76) (.64) 
Years of schooling .0107 .0686 -.0363 
 (1.02) (1.34) (.72) 
Pseudo R2 .0455 .0569 .0149 
N 64853 67883 67901 
Test: Joint effects of child labor 
         and schooling are zero 
Chi2(1)=8.58 Chi2(1)=45.08 Chi2=16.40 
Overidentification test Chi2(1)=3.08 Chi2(1)=.03 Chi2(1)=.18 
    
 Heart Kidney Depression 
Age started to work -.1016* -.0215 -.1132 
 (1.66) (.58) (.16) 
Years of schooling .0493 .0010 .0867 
 (1.01) (.10) (.13) 
Pseudo R2 .0437 .0213 .0465 
N 67857 67927 67867 
Test: Joint effects of child labor 
         and schooling are zero 
Chi2(1)=18.59 Chi2(1)=.81 Chi2(1)=23.80 
Overidentification test Chi2(1)=.25 Chi2(1)=.33 Chi2(1)=.04 
    
 Tuberculosis Tendonitis Cirrhosis 
Age started to work .0067 .0272 -.0042 
 (.85) (.97) (.89) 
Years of schooling -.0057 -.0265 .0033 
 (.95) (1.18) (.889) 
Pseudo R2 .0416 .0386 .0380 
N 64421 67857 66459 
Test: Joint effects of child labor 
         and schooling are zero 
Chi2(1)=1.45 Chi2(1)=.65 Chi2(1)=.93 
Overidentification test Chi2(1)=3.93 Chi2(1)=.44 Chi2(1)=.2.76 
Note. 1 .Marginal probabilities are reported rather than probit coefficients.  
          2. Regression also includes dummy variables for cohort and state of birth and demographic variables in 
              Table 3.   
          3. |Z| statistics from the initial estimation using New’s minimum chi square estimators are reported in 
              parentheses.  
          4. The Amemiya-Lee-Newey test results for overidentification of instruments were generated using 
              Baum, Schaffer, Stillman and Wiggins’ (2006) overid.ado program for Stata.9.  
          5. The overidentification test and joint test is distributed chi2 (1) with a critical value of 3.84 at the .10 
              significance level. 
                *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. 
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 Appendix 4.a. Partial probit estimates of functional disability of age started to work and  
 years of schooling completed 
 
Variables Pushing and carrying Bending down Walking 100m 
Age started to work -.0005*** -.0017*** -.0001*** 
 (.0001) (.0002) (.0001) 
Years of schooling -.0004*** -.0017*** -.0002*** 
 (.0001) (.0002) (.0001) 
    
Pseudo R2 .0519 .0747 .0377 
N 67901 67857 66574 
Note. 1. Marginal probabilities are reported rather than probit coefficients.  
          2. Regression also includes dummy variables for cohort and state of birth and demographic variables in 
              Table 3. 
          3. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
            *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. 
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 Appendix 4.b. IV Estimates-second stage regression on the probability of having difficulty 
 performing activity 
 
Variables 
Pushing and 
carrying 
Bending down Walking 100m 
Age started to work .0044 -.0552 -.0058 
 (.24) (1.34) (.67) 
Years of schooling -.0218 .0070 -.0011 
 (1.32) (.18) (.00) 
    
Pseudo R2 .0501 .0616 .0347 
N 67901 67857 66574 
Joint effects of child labor and schooling 
are zero at sample mean 
Chi2(1)=.22 Chi2(1)=10.06 Chi2(1)=1.04 
Overidentification test Chi2(1)=.14 Chi2(1)=2.08 Chi2(1)=.53 
Note. 1 .Marginal probabilities are reported rather than probit coefficients.  
          2. Regression also includes dummy variables for cohort and state of birth and demographic variables in 
              Table 3. 
          3. |Z| statistics from the initial estimation using New’s minimum chi square estimators are reported in 
              parentheses.  
          4. The Amemiya-Lee-Newey test results for overidentification of instruments were generated using 
              Baum, Schaffer, Stillman and Wiggins’ (2006) overid.ado program for Stata.9.  
          5. The overidentification test and joint test is distributed chi2 (1) with a critical value of 3.84 at the .10 
              significance level. 
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 Appendix 5.a. Estimates of child labor effect on incidence of selected chronic disease for 
 people with lower primary (4-7 years of) schooling    
 
 Spine Arthritis Hypertension 
Age started to work    
    Age started to work <12 .082*** .044*** .016 
 (.015) (.009) (.011) 
    Age started to work 12-14 .013*** .016 .019 
 (.016) (.010) (.012) 
    
    Pseudo R2 .016 .058 .031 
    N 6554 6548 6548 
Note. 1. Regression also includes dummy variables for state of birth and demographic variables. 
          2. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
              *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. 
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 Appendix 5.b. Estimates of child labor effect on the probability of having difficulty 
 performing activity for people with lower primary (4-7 years of) schooling    
 
 Raising object Climbing stairs Walking 1km 
Age started to work    
    Age started to work <12 .021*** .010* .012*** 
 (.008) (.005) (.005) 
    Age started to work 12-14 .018** .016*** .002 
 (.009) (.006) (.005) 
    
    Pseudo R2 .043 .058 .063 
    N 6543 6543 6531 
Note. 1. Regression also includes dummy variables for state of birth and demographic variables. 
          2. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
              *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. 
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 Appendix 6.a. IV Estimates-second stage regression on incidence of chronic disease by  
 gender 
 
Variables  Back problems Arthritis Cancer 
 Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Age started to work -.1382 -.2897 -.0535 -.1090 -.0262 -.0080 
 (.94) (1.39) (.28) (1.10) (.49) (.49) 
Years of schooling .0239 .1321 -.0555 .0222 .0195 .0050 
 (.17) (.78) (.86) (.09) (.58) (.13) 
Pseudo R2 .0283 .0224 .0722 .0630 .0474 .0479 
N 28043 39884 28033 39848 25513 33980 
Joint effect test 4.54 15.97 2.84 6.75 8.20 1.29 
Overidentification test .003 5.06 2.09 4.13 5.58 4.28 
       
 Diabetes Asthma Hypertension 
 Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Age started to work -.1125 -.1061 .0724 .0217 -.3944 -.4192 
 (1.04) (1.37) (.96) (.64) (1.11) (1.44) 
Years of schooling .0663 .0658 -.0565 -.0196 .1942 .2442 
 (.80) (1.03) (.94) (.70) (.73) (1.03) 
Pseudo R2 .0660 .0536 .0142 .0099 .0655 .0411 
N 27851 39848 27988 39848 28009 39884 
Joint effect test 14.86 15.41 4.33 .46 29.58 44.23 
Overidentification test .022 .010 .248 .019 .018 .330 
Note. 1 .Marginal probabilities are reported rather than probit coefficients.  
          2. Regression also includes dummy variables for cohort and state of birth and demographic variables in 
              Table 3.. 
          3. |Z| statistics from the initial estimation using New’s minimum chi square estimators are reported in 
              parentheses.  
          4. The Amemiya-Lee-Newey test results for overidentification of instruments were generated using 
              Baum, Schaffer, Stillman and Wiggins’ (2006) overid.ado program for Stata.9.  
          5. The overidentification test and joint test is distributed chi2 (1) with a critical value of 3.84 at the .10 
              significance level. 
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 Appendix 6.a. (continued) 
 
Variables  Heart disease Kidney disease Depression 
 Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Age started to work -.0686 -.1264 .0116 -.0554 -.2038 -.0512 
 (.87) (1.32) (.35) (.98) (1.09) (.92) 
Years of schooling .0178 .0729 -.0224 .0265 .1481 .0420 
 (.36) (.93) (.69) (.56) (1.00) (.93) 
Pseudo R2 .0456 .0338 .0203 .0258 .0134 .0095 
N 27982 39848 28033 39831 28016 39831 
Joint effect test 4.05 12.78 .9714 3.14 11.21 1.48 
Overidentification test .011 .306 .167 .017 .001 .543 
       
 Tuberculosis† Tendonitis Cirrhosis 
 Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Age started to work -.0046 .0142 .0199 .0296 -.0101 -.0016 
 (.20) (1.14) (.48) (.79) (.58) (.29) 
Years of schooling .0043 -.0128 -.0196 -.0294 .0085 .0008 
 (.26) (1.37) (.57) (.98) (.58) (.01) 
Pseudo R2 .0447 .0390 .0265 .0189 .0105 .0369 
N 17142 37838 28009 39815 22137 39000 
Joint effect test .45 3.47 .17 .81 2.21 .04 
Overidentification test 1.285 2.497 .087 .317 .189 2.973 
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 Appendix 6.b. IV Estimates-second stage regression on incidence of functional disability by  
 Gender 
 
Variables Raising object† Pushing  & carrying Climbing stairs† 
 Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Age started to work .0161 -.1160 .0479 -.0215 -.0059 -.1233 
 (.26) (1.28) (.78) (.77) (.01) (1.34) 
Years of schooling -.0721 .0319 -.0613 .0032 -.0325 .0740 
 (1.07) (.42) (1.20) (.08) (.75) (.98) 
Pseudo R2 .0468 .0430 .0365 .0298 .0569 .0396 
N 28033 39868 28033 39793 28033 39793 
Joint effect test .18 8.73 .79 2.11 .44 17.42 
Overidentification test .083 1.065 .182 .026 .353 .001 
    
 Bending down Walking 1km Walking 100m† 
 Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Age started to work -.0562 -.0409 .0367 -.0452 .0185 -.0309 
 (.74) (.88) (.60) (1.08) (.67) (1.27) 
Years of schooling -.0063 .0069 -.0574 .0216 -.0199 .0196 
 (.11) (.13) (1.08) (.64) (.91) (.98) 
Pseudo R2 .0566 .0459 .0426 .0345 .0429 .0302 
N 28009 39815 27937 39780 27360 37854 
Joint effect test 3.67 3.25 .11 4.03 1.34 8.70 
Overidentification test .412 1.846 .097 .462 .451 .070 
Note. 1 .Marginal probabilities are reported rather than probit coefficients.  
          2. Regression also includes dummy variables for cohort and state of birth and demographic variables in 
              Table 3. 
          3. |Z| statistics from the initial estimation using New’s minimum chi square estimators are reported in 
              parentheses.  
          4. † There are jointly differential effects of child labor and years of schooling completed on adult health 
                 between male and female sampled group. 
          5. The Amemiya-Lee-Newey test results for overidentification of instruments were generated using 
              Baum, Schaffer, Stillman and Wiggins’ (2006) overid.ado program for Stata.9.  
          6. The overidentification test and joint test is distributed chi2 (1) with a critical value of 3.84 at the .10 
              significance level. 
.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
135 
 
Chapter 5. General Conclusion 
 
This dissertation examined the interrelationships between child labor, schooling and 
health, using nationally representative data from U.S. and from Brazil. The analyses assumed 
that parents allocate child time between work and school in the context of the family’s utility 
optimization problem. Parents make these decisions taking into account information on the 
child’s abilities and health endowments that are not observable to outside observers. These 
decisions also take into account presumed impacts of child labor on the child’s lifetime 
human capital development and health. 
 In that context, the dissertation examined (1) whether state government legislation 
restricting youth employment actually change parental decisions on child time allocations to 
work or school, and whether the legislation affects academic achievements; (2) whether there 
is a cumulative effect of teen work on schooling outcomes; and (3) whether child labor 
affects future adult health. 
In the second chapter, I examined how state child labor legislation affects the 
employment and school decisions of youth aged 14 through 17. If state restrictions on child 
labor are useful, they should be tied to measurable employment status or academic outcomes. 
I found that more stringent child labor laws requiring work permit under age 18 and 
mandating that children stay in school through age 17 or 18 years have almost no impact on 
teen labor supply decisions. The exception is a modestly lower frequency of work that 
violates federal hours guidelines in states with more stringent child labor laws. While state 
work permit requirements have a very small positive effect on the likelihood of college entry, 
truancy laws do not affect the likelihood of going to college, but increase marginally high 
school academic performance. These findings suggest that state labor laws do not have strong 
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effects on youth labor supply choices and that hours restrictions are not well supported by 
evidence on adverse impacts of work hours on schooling. 
In the third chapter, I examined the effects of working while in school on probability 
of dropout, high school grade point average, and the probability of attending college. Past 
studies have suggested that working while in high school does not affect high school GPA. 
My instrumental variable estimates indicated that more intensive employment experiences 
while attending high school have a small and insignificant effect on high school GPA. 
However, increased high school work intensity does alter the distribution of years of 
schooling completed: raising the likelihood of completing high school but lowering the 
probability of going to college. A 10% increase in cumulative hours of work in high school 
leads to a 1.4% decreased likelihood of entering college. These results are similar for boys 
and girls, and so working in school does not explain the gap in college entry between men 
and women. 
In the fourth chapter, I examined the long term effect of child labor on health in 
Brazil. The results are complex. When child labor and schooling are treated as exogenous 
variables, child labor appears to increase the likelihood of poor health outcomes in adulthood 
across almost all health indicators. However, when work and school are considered 
endogenous, child labor loses power to explain most adverse adult health outcomes. 
Nevertheless, I still find evidence that there is a significant joint effect of child labor and 
schooling on the incidence of chronic health conditions later in life. This finding is consistent 
with other evidence that child laborers select lifetime occupations with higher incidences of 
ailments and physical disabilities.  
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On the whole, these chapters show that child labor can have adverse consequences for 
lifetime learning and health, even if the work is legal and not of the “worst forms” of child 
labor. In the U.S., the adverse effects of child labor on schooling are small but statistically 
significant. Child work is only weakly responsive to regulatory efforts, suggesting that child 
labor laws are not effectively enforced. In Brazil, child labor appears to contribute to the 
early onset of some physical disabilities, although the effects are typically modest in 
magnitude. These findings suggest that policies limiting child labor may be justified as a 
means of improving the child’s welfare later in life, but weak enforcement means that such 
policies have been only modestly successful in the past.  
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